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INTRODUCTION

The most common method' of reporting income for federal income tax purposes, particularly for individuals and
small businesses,2 is the "cash receipts and disbursements
method." 3 This method is generally referred to as the "cash
method" of accounting. Under this method, a taxpayer reports income in the year of "receipt" 4 and deducts expenses in
the year of "payment."' 5 As a result, it is frequently stated
that the essence of the cash method is "receipt." For this reason issues as to when income was due, or earned, are generally
irrelevant in determining when to include income under the
cash method.
1. See 2
2. Id.

MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §

12.40 (rev. ed. 1985).

3. The "cash receipt and disbursements" method of accounting is expressly recognized as a permissible method of accounting. 26 U.S.C. § 446(c)(1) (1986) [hereinafter
all references to the Internal Revenue Code will be to its I.R.C. section number, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 446(c) (1)].
4. The Internal Revenue Code presumptively requires income to be reported in the
year of receipt unless the taxpayer's method of accounting requires inclusion in a different period. See I.R.C. § 451(a) (1986). The regulations governing cash method accounting mandate the same result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1987).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1).
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In contrast, "earning" is the crucial focus of the "accrual
method ' 6 of accounting. Under this method, a taxpayer is required to include income in the taxable period when "all the
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy." ' 7 Although the Internal Revenue Code
permits the utilization of other methods of accounting, 8 most
taxpayers utilize either the cash method or accrual method of
accounting in reporting their income for federal tax purposes.
As the accrual method attempts to measure economic activity during a taxable period by determining whether it was
"earned" during that period, it is generally viewed as a more
reliable method for accurately reporting income than the cash
method. 9 Because of its reliance on the concept of receipt,
economic distortions in accurately reporting income can result under the cash method. For example, the cash method
permits income earned in other years to be considered in the
reporting year,'" and permits income earned, but not received
6. The accrual method, like the cash method, is statutorily recognized as a permissible method of accounting for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 446(c)(2).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a).
8. While the cash method and the accrual method are the most common methods
of reporting income for federal income tax purposes, they are not exclusive. The Internal Revenue Code specifically permits the utilization of other methods of accounting for
federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 446(c)(3). The Code also permits hybrid
methods of accounting. Id. at § 446(c)(4). However, hybrid methods are specifically
made subject to regulatory constraints. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3, which regulates
the long term contract method of accounting.
9. In United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), Justice Stone indicated that
accrual method accounti,, was established as an alternative to the cash method for the
following reason:
It was to enable taxrtyers to keep their books and make their returns according
to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income earned during the
taxable period, the eypenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period ....
Id. at 440.
10. In Willcuts v. Gradwohl, 58 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1932), the court noted this
distinction in the following comparison of the cash and accrual methods of accounting:
There were and are two accepted methods of such accounting resting on different bases. One was based on the theory of actual receipts and disbursements
during the year. The other - called accrual basis - was based upon liabilities
to and against the taxpayer contracted for during the year. Since the forner
basis dealt with realizationsit probably was a truer measure, yet the latter was not
unacceptable.
Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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in the reporting year, to be deferred to future years. As the
time of actual receipt may be pre-arranged by taxpayers, the
cash method is viewed as more susceptible to manipulation
than the accrual method. Based on these types of distinctions,
Congress enacted section 448 of the Code in 1986, requiring
certain entities to report income by the accrual method.11 In
mandating this result, Congress determined that the cash
method frequently failed to accurately reflect the actual economic activity of a taxpayer over its taxable year. 12 Despite
this trend toward increased mandatory use of accrual method
accounting, cash method accounting still survives as the most
common method for reporting income for federal income tax
purposes.13 This resiliency is attributable inter alia to its conceptual simplicity, ease of administration, pervasive acceptance among taxpayers, and the staggering 14 compliance costs
that would be incurred if all5 taxpayers were required to convert to the accrual method.'
Despite these strong reasons for its continued existence,
the reporting distortions that would result from the wholly
unregulated operation of the cash method would quickly undermine the integrity of the federal tax system and threaten
citizen confidence in the fairness of the income tax system.
Responding to such concerns, the responsible agencies of gov17
ernment have developed a number of statutory,16 regulatory,
11. Section 448(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted as § 801 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986,
presumptively places all Subchapter C corporations, partnerships with Subchapter C
corporations as partners, and charitable trusts with unrelated business taxable income
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 511(b) and tax shelters as defined in I.R.C. § 461(i)(3)
on the accrual method. The most significant exceptions to this general rule are "Qualified Personal Service Corporations" as defined in section 448(d)(2). Thus, despite the
general sweep of section 448 most corporations involved in rendering service to the
public will continue to report their income for federal income tax purposes on the cash
method.
12. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 604-09 (1985); S. REP. No. 313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19 (1986).
13. Even prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, an impetus in favor of mandatory
accrual accounting had developed. For example, any taxpayer utilizing inventory is
required to account for purchases and sales under the accrual method. Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(c)(2)(ii).
14. See supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. E.g., I.R.C. § 461(i) where interest paid by a cash method taxpayer must be
amortized over the life of the loan regardless of the time of actual payment. In enacting
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and decisional 8 devices which seek to remedy abuses occasioned by taxpayer efforts to deflect income into future years
through the manipulation of the fact "receipt." One decisional device which the courts and the Treasury have utilized
to insure the equitable administration of the cash method is
the "economic benefit doctrine." 1 9 As cash method accounting appears to be an integral part of the income tax system for
the foreseeable future, this doctrine will continue to have a
significant role in determining tax consequences for a great
number of taxpayers. Although the pervasiveness of the doctrine has been diminished significantly by the adoption of certain statutory provisions such as section 83 of the Code, tax
practitioners should still have a working familiarity with the
elements of the doctrine and the extent of its inclusionary
reach.
It is the intent of this article to:
1. Identify and distinguish the operative elements of the
economic benefit doctrine from the closely related theothis statute, Congress has effectively placed all taxpayers on the accrual method for
purposes of deducting interest. See also the provisions of the Code mandating similar
treatment for the inclusion and deduction of "Original Issue Discount." I.R.C. §§ 483
& 1271-1275.
17. For example, the doctrine of constructive receipt which requires a cash basis
taxpayer to include an item in income even though not actually received if it is "constructively" received. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2. The elements of the doctrine are enunciated in the regulation as follows:

Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon
it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if
notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions.
Id.

18. See also Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States, 296 U.S. 60 (1935). In
Raybestos, the Supreme Court held that the payment by an obligated party to a third
party, at the direction of and for the benefit of its obligee, constituted income to the
obligee even though it had not actually received any income. Id.
19. The clearest judicial elucidation of the economic benefit doctrine appears in
Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
Despite the pervasiveness of the doctrine, only a few articles have specifically examined
its theory and application. See Burke & Friel, Escrow Agreement Effectively Delays Income for a Cash-Basis Taxpayer, 8 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 251 (1984); McDonald, Deferred Compensation: ConceptualAstigmatism, 24 TAx L. REV. 201 (1969);
Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case
Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX. L. REV. 525 (1974).
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ties of receipt by agent, constructive receipt, and cash
equivalency with which it is frequently confused by both
courts and tax practitioners.
Describe the legal evolution of the economic benefit doctrine, and isolate and discuss factual settings in which
the economic benefit doctrine has been applied. These
settings have included:
A. Employer/employee relationships.
B. Prizes and awards.
C. Personal injury awards.
D. Escrow arrangements to effectuate the sale of
property.
Analyze recent court decisions and Treasury rulings
concerning the economic benefit doctrine, and express
certain opinions about the future of the doctrine.
WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT DoCTRINE?

The economic benefit doctrine is reputed 2° to have been
born in dictum of the 1945 opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith. 2 1 In Smith the taxpayer had received a compensatory option from his employer
to purchase stock in another corporation at a fixed value. At
the time of its exercise, the option price was lower than the
fair market value of the stock.2 2 The Commissioner argued
that this difference represented compensation to the employee
includible in his gross income in the year the option was
executed.2 3
In the absence of the current section 83 of the Code, which
prescribes the taxable period of inclusion of such benefits, 24
20. See, e.g., Jacuzzi v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 262, 266 (1973); McDonald, supra
note 19, at 550.
21. 324 U.S. 177 (1945). Arguably, the doctrine is merely an outgrowth of the
principles established in Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
22. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. at 177-78.
23. Id.
24. Under current law, this same result would clearly occur by application of the
inclusionary provisions of I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) and the specific timing provision of I.R.C.
§ 83(a). While § 83 does not itself act to include the bargain element in the taxpayer's
gross income it does specify the time for the inclusion in to gross income of property
transferred in connection with the performance of services. The inclusion in gross income itself occurs as a result of the operation of § 61. Generally speaking, under the
provisions of § 83, the difference between the amount paid for qualifying property and
the fair market value of the property is included in the gross income of the person who
performed the services in the first year in which the rights of the person having the
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the Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's position based
on the general provisions of the 1938 Revenue Act which included in gross income "gains, profits, and income derived
from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, of
whatever kind and in whatever form paid ....
In broad dictum, the Court made the following pronouncement concerning the inclusionary sweep of the Federal
Income Tax Code:
The Revenue Act is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic orfinancialbenefit conferred on the employee as compensation whatever the form or mode by which

it is effected.26
The lasting impact of the Smith case has not been its ratio
decidendi, for that decision was clearly within the ambit of
existing and well settled principles of tax law. However, the
suggestion of its dictum that the Tax Code was sufficiently
encompassing to reach many nontraditional methods of compensating cash basis taxpayers provided the Commissioner a
new weapon. Predictably, the Treasury aggressively utilized
this new weapon and attempted to tax benefits to cash basis
taxpayers where the issue of receipt was questionable.
From this seed sprang a body of both regulatory and decisional law which developed the dictum of the Smith case into
an axiom of tax law which ultimately became known as the
economic benefit doctrine. In order for the modern doctrine
to apply, an individual must unconditionally transfer money
beyond the reach of the transferor's creditors and place that
money in a fund in which the taxpayer to be benefited has
beneficial interest in the property are "transferable" or are not subject to a "substantial
risk of forfeiture." I.R.C. § 83.
It has been observed that the adoption of § 83 reduced the overall scope of the
economic benefit doctrine by prescribing specific statutory rules for property transferred
in conjunction with the rendition of services:
Under current law, the common-law concept of economic benefit in the field
of employee compensation has far less independent significance than it did prior
to 1969, when the Tax Reform Act introduced § 83 of the Code. Section 83 both
codifies and expands the common-law notions of economic benefit as they relate
to property transferred in connection with the performance of services.
Metzer, supra note 19, at 552 (citations omitted). The effect of § 83 on the judicially
created economic benefit doctrine is addressed in the conclusion of this Article.
25. Smith, 324 U.S. at 180 (citing § 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1938).
26. Smith, 324 U.S. at 181.
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vested rights. Thus, the doctrine focuses on situations where
a cash basis taxpayer having a right to receive money elects to
defer the income that would arise from the receipt of the
money by pre-arranging to have the money deposited in a
third party account. 28 A disinterested third party, such as a
trustee or escrow agent, pays the money to the taxpayer in a
later taxable period. The taxpayer asserts that he is not required to include the income until actually received. Such a
transaction lacks substance because the only restriction placed
on the distribution of funds is the time requirement established by the taxpayer. In such instances the taxpayer is virtually guaranteed payment, albeit deferred, without risking the
insolvency of the obligated party. 29 Were such an arrangement permitted to defer the reporting of gain, the proper time
for reporting income would be totally entrusted to the caprice
of the taxpayer.
Armed with these concerns, the courts have developed the
economic benefit doctrine which requires the inclusion in income of such amounts in the taxable period in which the fund
was created. In one of its most well known formulations, the
economic benefit doctrine has been summarized as follows:
Pursuant to [the economic benefit doctrine] the creation by
an obligor of afund in which the taxpayer has vested rights
will result in immediate inclusion by the taxpayer of the
amount funded. A "fund" is created when an amount is irrevocably placed with a third party, and a taxpayer's interest
in such fund is "vested" if it is nonforfeitable.3 °

27. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966). This General Counsel's Memorandum is the most detailed analysis of the Treasury's position on the economic benefit
doctrine that is available. While the memorandum is cited frequently in subsequent
Treasury rulings, it has never been formally released by the Treasury and is not currently available in either of the major legal research computer networks. The author
obtained a copy of the ruling by filing a request with the Treasury pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1986). This copy of General Counsel
Memorandum 33733 and all Treasury rulings cited in this article are maintained in a file
bearing the name of this article at the Reserve Desk of the Stetson University College of
Law Library, 1401 61st Street S., St. Petersburg, Florida, 33707.
28. Smith, 324 U.S. at 181.
29. Such transfers would be subject to the anti-preference and anti-fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and applicable state law. See, e.g., I1 U.S.C.
§§ 547-48 (1986).
30. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966) (emphasis added).
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The development of the economic benefit doctrine was
motivated by the same concerns that nurtured the development of the doctrines of constructive receipt 3 ' and cash
equivalency.32 While many aspects of the economic benefit
doctrine are similar in intent to these related theories, the economic benefit doctrine differs from these theories and complements them by applying to situations not technically subject
to either theory. In reality, the inadequacies of these existing
doctrines nurtured the development of the economic benefit
doctrine. Nonetheless, due to their common origins and close
philosophical relationship, these three doctrines are frequently
confused. 33 The economic benefit doctrine and its interrelationship with constructive receipt and cash equivalency can
most effectively be presented by example.34
Assume that a professional football player, a cash method
taxpayer,35 is negotiating to enter into an employment con36
tract with his employer for the provision of athletic services.
31. For a general discussion of the doctrine of constructive receipt see supra note
17.
32. Generally, the cash equivalency doctrine is based on the premise that certain
items of intangible personal property, such as promissory notes and contract rights are
so freely transferable at established values that they are equivalent to cash and should be
treated so for income tax purposes. For a classic discussion of the elements of the cash
equivalency doctrine see Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
33. Both the courts and the commentators have noted the confusion that exists in
distinguishing these interrelated doctrines. For example, the United States Tax Court
in Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977), made the observation that "the doctrine of constructive receipt [is] a concept that significantly differs from the theory of
economic benefit.., although admittedly the decided cases have not always been models of clarity in respect of the distinction." Id. at 817.
Likewise, in critiquing a case which appears to have confused all three of these doctrines, one set of commentators noted that "[tlhe court's intertwining of constructivereceipt and cash-equivalency notions with the economic-benefit doctrine suggests the
confusion surrounding the doctrine. Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 264.
34. The economic benefit doctrine is "[a]n approach resembling the doctrines of
constructive receipt and cash equivalence .... Though dangerously vague in outline,

the concept conveys some meaning - perhaps best conveyed by example -

as it bears

on the timing of taxing income." J. McNULTY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 279 (West 3d ed. 1983).

35. Hereinafter, all taxpayers referenced in this article are cash method taxpayers
unless expressly identified as accrual method taxpayers. As the economic benefit doctrine was developed to remedy a perceived abuse that resulted from cash method accounting, it is generally viewed as not having any applicability to accrual method
taxpayers.
36. This illustration is loosely based on example four contained in Rev. Rul. 60-31,
1960-1 C.B. 174. This revenue ruling is frequently identified as one of the most signifi-
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Assume further that the team is willing to pay the player a
$100,000 signing bonus. Prior to the execution of the contract
and at the behest of the player, the team agrees to transfer the
sum of $100,000 to a bank as an escrow agent in lieu of the
bonus. Under the negotiated terms of the escrow agreement,
the bank will invest the funds. Ultimately the $100,000 plus
accrued interest will be paid to the football player at a date
five years after the establishment of the escrow. The football
player's rights under the agreement are non-assignable.
Should the football player die during the pendency of the escrow agreement, all amounts due from the escrow will be paid
to the player's estate. The team itself will have no continuing
obligation to the player in regard to the bonus after transfer
into escrow. After the initial transfer, the team will not retain
any rights in the escrow account. Under this arrangement,
the player will have an irrevocably vested interest in the escrowed fund conditioned only on the passage of time. As the
money has been transferred beyond the control of the team,
the escrowed money would not be subject to the team's creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy 37 should the team become insolvent. In effect, the player is virtually38 assured of ultimate
payment, and this assurance would not be affected by his
cant rulings for the development of the economic benefit doctrine. Curiously, while the
Treasury Department plainly applied the economic benefit doctrine in example four, it
does not identify the doctrine by name, and the title to the ruling identifies the ruling as
pertaining to the doctrine of constructive receipt.
37. This statement is, of course, subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
and state law prohibiting certain preferences and fraudulent conveyances. See supra
note 29.
38. Theoretically, an issue may be presented as to whether this certainty isjeopardized by the prospect of the insolvency of the escrow agent. With the availability of
governmental depository insurance, this risk is minimized where a qualifying financial
institution serves as the escrow agent. In the only case which has argued the prospective insolvency of a financial institution as an issue, the court was not impressed. In
Watson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 544 (1978) the court stated:
In his brief petitioner takes the position that "the letter of credit is not equivalent
to cash because a bank can go broke" and points out that this "was not a deposit
and it was not insured by FDIC." The solvency or insolvency of the obligor is
an important factor in determining cash equivalency. However, in case of an
issuing bank's insolvency, the security held or the funds provided to the bank to
cover the credit are separate from the general assets of the bank ....
In any
event, there is not a word of evidence suggesting that Security Bank was not fully
solvent and, indeed, a thriving institution. And the undisputed fact is that the
letter of credit was honored and paid when presented.
Id. at 552 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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death or the insolvency or bankruptcy of the team. In the
absence of the economic benefit doctrine, this fund would not
have to be reported for income tax purposes by a cash method
taxpayer until received by the taxpayer. This advantageous
state of affairs would have been occasioned solely by the fact
that the football player was a cash method taxpayer and that
he contractually arranged to defer the receipt of the bonus
from the current year into the future.
If the hypothetical athlete had been an accrual basis taxpayer the issue of deferral of the income could never have
arisen. Under basic principles of accrual method accounting,
income is included in the taxable period in which all events
have occurred which fix the right to receive the income and
where the amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy.3 9 Under the case law interpreting this test, income is
generally included in the earliest taxable period in which it is
earned, due or paid.' The application of this standard would
require the football player to include the escrowed funds in
income in the year the escrow arrangement was created. As a
result, the potential for taxpayer abuse under our assumed
facts is limited to cash method taxpayers. 4
Many would instinctively conclude that our hypothetical
cash basis taxpayer should be compelled to include the fund in
gross income in the year the escrow was established. Such
inclusion could only occur as a result of an equitable modification of traditional cash method accounting. This suggests the
application of the doctrines of receipt by agent, constructive
receipt or cash equivalency. However, none of these doctrines
technically apply to our assumed facts.
First, it can hardly be argued that the athlete in our illustration is in actual receipt of the escrowed bonus. However,
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.45 1-1(a) (1987) ("under an accrual method of accounting,
income is includible in gross income when all the events have occurred which fix the
right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy.") Id.
40. See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
41. Nonetheless, in at least two memoranda the General Counsel's office has attempted to apply economic benefit doctrine principles to accrual method taxpayers. In

Gen. Couns. Mem. 37073 (Mar. 31, 1977) and Gen. Couns. Mem. 36833 (Sept. 7,
1976), the drafters discuss the doctrine in determining the income tax consequences to
accrual method taxpayers of escrow accounts where distribution is contingent on future
performance. Such applications appear isolated.
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receipt by an exclusive agent has been determined to constitute income to the principal. 42 Therefore, it is at least arguable that the bank/escrow agent is the agent of the taxpayer,
and that receipt of the bonus by the agent constituted income
to the athlete. While this argument has met with limited success in other settings,4 3 under state law the escrow agent
would be viewed as holding, investing, and distributing the
funds as the agent of both the team and the athlete.' As the
escrow agent would not be the exclusive agent of the athlete,
the agent's receipt of the bonus would not constitute income
to the athlete under a receipt by agent theory.
Second, many would assert that our football player should
be required to include the escrowed bonus in income in the
year the fund was created under notions of constructive receipt.4a Constructive receipt is one of the equitable devices
which was developed by the Treasury to prevent abusive manipulation of cash method accounting. Under this doctrine, a
42. The receipt by agent doctrine, which holds that actual receipt by an agent will
be treated as receipt by the principal for purposes of cash method accounting, is an
application of both constructive receipt principles and state agency law. Under the doctrine, the courts have held that monies received by a taxpayer's agent will be deemed to
have been constructively received by the principal in the taxable year in which payment
occurs. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
43. See, e.g., Arnwine v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983).
44. An escrow agent is not technically an agent of either party to the transaction
during the pendency of the escrow. "An escrow holder is not as such an agent of either
party to the transaction until the event occurs which terminates the escrow relation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14D (1957). Comment b to § 14D clarifies
this statement of law:
If the escrow holder has received property from each of two persons under a
contract by which the property of each is to be transferred to the other upon the
happening of an event, each depositor has a conditional claim against the escrow
holder dependent upon what occurs. If the event happens which is to complete
the transaction, the escrow holder becomes the agent in possession of the property or the holder of the title for the new owner. If the event does not happen
before the specified time, the escrow is ended and the holder becomes the agent
for each party as to the property which each had deposited with him.
Id. at comment b.
In Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (lst Cir. 1983), the court, although describing what comment b to the Restatement identifies as a "conditional" claim as a dual
agency, reached the same conclusion by stating that "[c]ourts have generally recognized
that an escrowee does not serve as a taxpayer's agent for income recognition purposes
where, as in this case, the escrow arrangement is a valid one, under which the escrowee
represents both the taxpayer-seller and the other party to the escrow agreement, i.e., the
buyer." Id. at 149.
45. For a general discussion of the doctrine see supra note 17.
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taxpayer who has not actually received an item of income may
still be required to report it for income tax purposes. This
inclusion occurs if the income has been set aside for the taxpayer and if the taxpayer has the right to receive the income
without "substantial limitation or restrictions. '46 This doctrine was established to prevent a cash basis taxpayer from
intentionally declining to accept income with the intent of deferring the time in which the income was
required to be re47
ported into a subsequent taxable period.
Superficially, this doctrine appears to apply to our athlete.48 Under our assumed facts the football player could have
received payment of the bonus in the year of execution. The
team had agreed to pay the bonus at that time. Nevertheless,
our athlete would not be required to include the bonus in the
year of the creation under the constructive receipt doctrine
because that doctrine recognizes the ability of a taxpayer to
impose limitations by contract which determine the year in
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1987).
47. See, e.g., Rhombar Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 75 (1966); Hamilton Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 63 (1933).
48. This belief generally exists because of the confusion exhibited by the courts and
practitioners in distinguishing the elements of constructive receipt from the elements of
the economic benefit doctrine. One attempt to distinguish the doctrine drew the following distinctions:
The concept of economic benefit is quite different from that of constructive receipt. Unlike constructive receipt, economic benefit requires the actual receipt of
property or the actual receipt of a right to receive property in the future, at
which point, the doctrine asks whether the property or the right confers a present economic benefit with an ascertainable fair market value. Constructive receipt, on the other hand, requires only the ability to receive property on an
immediate basis, and subjects the present value of the property, itself, to taxation
Stated in more elementary terms, constructive receipt deals with "when"
property should be included in a taxpayer's gross income (when actually received or at some point prior to actual receipt), while economic benefit deals
with "what" property or rights actually received by a taxpayer should be subject
to immediate taxation. In practical application, however, the concepts are frequently confused, and one will find both the courts and the government asking
whether the enjoyment of property or the right to receive property not immediately subject to taxpayer's control results in constructive receipt, or whether taxpayer's mere ability to withdraw funds on an immediate basis confers an
economic benefit.
Metzer, supra note 19, at 551 (footnote omitted).
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which income is to be received.4 9 Technically, the doctrine
only applies when the taxpayer has acquired a vested interest
in receiving money or property and the taxpayer thereafter
attempts to postpone its inclusion by deferring actual receipt.
Therefore, an executory contract requiring payment five years
in the future, executed prior to the time the income subject to
the contract was due or earned, would operate as a "substantial restriction or limitation" and the constructive receipt doctrine would not require the inclusion of the bonus in gross
income. As the courts have prohibited the Treasury from pursuing a constructive receipt argument predicated on the fact
that the payor would have agreed to an earlier payment,50
constructive receipt would not appear to apply to our fact
situation.
In disposing of the Commissioner's constructive receipt
argument in an analogous setting, the First Circuit enunciated
this distinction:
As long as the deferred payment agreement is binding between the parties and is made prior to the time when the
taxpayer-seller has acquired an absolute and unconditional
right to receive payment, then the cash basis taxpayer is not
required to report the sales proceeds as income until he actually receives them. l
Finally, it appears plausible that our football player should
be compelled to include the bonuses in income in the year the
escrow arrangement was created by operation of the cash
equivalency doctrine. 52 Like constructive receipt, this doctrine finds its formal pronouncement in interpretive Treasury
regulations.5 3 Under these regulations a cash method taxpayer is required to include all items in gross income
49. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Olmsted Ins. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1962); Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953); Schniers v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 511 (1977); Veit v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947).
50. See, e.g., Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949).
51. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 1983). Although that portion of the opinion dealing with the economic benefit doctrine is criticized in this article,
the court's discussion of constructive receipt is proper.
52. For a general discussion of the doctrine see supra note 19.
53. The relevant Treasury regulation states that "[glenerally, under the cash re-

ceipts and disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, all items which
constitute gross income (whether in theform of cash, property or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received." Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(c)(i) (1987) (emphasis added).
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"whether in the form of cash, property, or services." 54 This
interpretation suggests that all items received in a taxable
transaction, including drafts, promissory notes and open account indebtedness, should be included in income in the year
of the transaction. Despite this language, the courts have held
that a mere promise to pay is not income under the cash
method.5 5 Instead, they have interpreted this language to require the inclusion of such items in a cash method 56 taxpayer's
income only when the intangible
personal property received
57
has a "cash equivalency.
The test established by the courts to determine when intangible personal property will constitute a "cash
' and when it will not, is summarized in the oftequivalent,"58
cited opinion59 of the Fifth Circuit in Cowden v.
Commissioner:
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1951); Zittel v. Commissioner,
12 B.T.A. 675 (1928).
56. The rationale behind requiring intangible personal property to have a "cash
equivalency" before it will constitute income to a cash basis taxpayer is allegedly to
maintain viable distinctions between cash method and accrual method accounting. Obviously, if such items as promissory notes were included in a cash basis obligee's gross
income in the year of their execution there would be little or no difference between the
reporting of such items on either a cash or accrual method. Consistent with the concept
of receipt which permeates the cash method, the courts have only required inclusions of
such items in gross income if they are the functional equivalent of cash. See Reed v.
Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 147 n.7. (1st Cir. 1983).
57. Henritze v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 505 (1940).
58. As a result of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, the cash equivalency
doctrine has a reduced role where transactions eligible for reporting under the installment method are involved. Generally speaking, under I.R.C. § 453(f)(3) the term
"payment" does not include the "receipt of evidences of indebtedness of the person
acquiring the property." This provision effectively operates to postpone inclusion until
actual payment. But see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3) which creates the following exception to this general statutory rule:
[T]he term "payment" does not include the receipt of evidences of indebtedness
of the person acquiring the property ....Receipt of an evidence of indebtedness
which is secured directly or indirectly by cash or a cash equivalent, such as a
bank certificate of deposit or a treasury note, will be treated as the receipt of
payment.
Id.
While I.R.C. § 453(f) suggests a reduced role for the cash equivalency doctrine in
general, the exception of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3) suggests continued vitality of the economic benefit doctrine which utilizes cash equivalency notions in conjunction with security arrangements involving trusts and escrow agreements. See Burke &
Friel, supra note 19, at 251 n.3; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5).
59. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
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A promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily
the equivalent of cash. Such an instrument may have been
issued by a maker of doubtful solvency, or for other reasons
such paper might be denied a ready acceptance in the market
place. We think the converse of this principle ought to be

applicable. We are convinced that if a promise to pay of a
solvent obligor is unconditionaland assignable, not subject to
set-offs, and is of a kind that is frequently transferred to
lenders or investors at a discount not substantially greater
than the generally prevailing premium for the use of money,
such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like
manner as cash would have been taxable had it been received
by the taxpayer rather than the obligation.6"

While our hypothetical situation would satisfy many of the
elements of the cash equivalency doctrine,6 1 our assumed facts

unquestionably fail the assignability requirement 62 because the
facts specifically assume that the football player's rights in the
60. Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
61. It is obvious that the cash equivalency doctrine and the economic benefit doctrine overlap in their respective spheres of operation. In effect both seek to determine
whether a taxpayer has received income or a right to receive future income which can
be currently valued. Therefore, in a number of instances a particular transaction may
be subject to inclusion in income under either doctrine. Nonetheless, this phenomenon
should not be misconstrued to suggest that the doctrines are identical in operation. For
example, in Reed the court apparently fell prey to this temptation and basically concluded that as the escrow was not subject to inclusion under the cash equivalency doctrine, it was not includible under the economic benefit doctrine. Reed v. Commissioner,
723 F.2d 138, 149 (Ist Cir. 1983).
62. In United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821
(1950), the court in an early interpretation of the economic benefit doctrine distinguished it from cash equivalency based on the issue of assignability. In Drescher, the
taxpayer's employer had purchased an annuity for the taxpayer which by its terms was
non-assignable. While it failed the cash equivalency test for this reason, it was included
under the economic benefit doctrine. The court made the following statement: "The
prohibition against assignment does not prove complete absence of present value. The
right to receive income payments which accrued to the plaintiff when the Optical Company received each contract represented a present economic benefit to him." Id. at 865.
For this reason, the economic benefit doctrine has been described as "an expansion
of the more limited notions of cash equivalence." Metzer, supra note 19, at 551. Yet
other commentators, while agreeing that the economic benefit doctrine was more expansive than cash equivalency, have concluded that this broader reach was necessary in
some instances "to maintain the integrity of both section 61 and the annual accounting
system." See, e.g., Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 263.
But see Drysdale v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960) where the court,
apparently confusing the economic benefit doctrine with cash equivalency, found nonassignability as precluding inclusion in income. This analysis has not been adopted by
any other courts and has been described by the Treasury as an "aberration." Gen.
Couns. Mem. 33373 (Nov. 30, 1966).
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escrow are non-assignable. As a result, the bonus could not be
included in the athlete's gross income under the traditional
elements of the cash equivalency doctrine.
At this juncture, it appears obvious that unless some doctrine of inclusion other than receipt by agent, constructive receipt or cash equivalency requires the athlete to report the
bonus in income in the year of the creation of the escrow, the
athlete will have succeeded in rearranging the taxable period
in which the bonus will be reported for income tax purposes.
As a result of these perceived shortcomings, the Treasury and
the courts have interpreted the dictum of
to require our
football player to include the bonus in the year it was set aside
under a separate doctrine which has become known as the
"economic benefit doctrine."
In its current state of development the economic benefit
doctrine requires a cash method taxpayer to include in gross
income items not actually received during the reporting period when the following elements are present:
1. There must be some
in which money or
64
property has been placed;
2. The fund so created must be
6 and beyond
the reach of the creditors of the party who transferred
the funds to the escrow or trust; and,
3. The fund must confer a "present economic benefit" 66
on the "beneficiary" of the fund and the beneficiary
63. See Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951),
194 F.2d 541 (6th cir.
1952); Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B. 127; Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966).
64. J. DODGE, TEACHERS' MANUAL To ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIAL ON
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES, POLICY, AND PLANNING 51 (1985).

65.
16 T.C. at 244; Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966).
66. The doctrine takes its name from this part of this requirement which merely
requires that the right to future income be sufficiently determinable that it can be valued
currently. This notion has been articulated as follows: "Under the general concept, an
individual will be taxed on any economic benefit conferred upon him, so long as and to
the extent that the benefit has an ascertainable fair market value." Metzer,
note
19, at 550.
Another commentator phrased this requirement as follows:
The economic benefit doctrine does not depend for its applicability on whether
the employee could have received cash by stretching out his hand. It is based on
the theory that the promise to pay deferred compensation in the future in and of
itself under certain circumstances may constitute an economic benefit or the
equivalent of cash to be taxed currently at present value, if it can be valued
currently with some exactness.
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must have vested nonforfeitable fights to the money 67
or property placed in the fund with receipt conditioned only on the passage of time.
Traditionally, the economic benefit doctrine was viewed as
only applying to benefits arising from an employer/employee
relationship. 68 This view existed primarily because the original applications of the doctrine occurred in employment settings. Despite this assertion, the doctrine is clearly applicable
in other areas. 69 The balance of this article will discuss the
evolution of the doctrine and its applications in different factual settings.
A. Employer/Employee Relationships
The economic benefit doctrine was born and later reached
doctrinal maturity in employer/employee relationships.7 °
McDonald, supra note 19, at 204.
67. See Sproull, 16 T.C. at 244; Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966).
68. This statement has frequently appeared in discussions of the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Metzer supra note 19, at 550, where it is stated that "[u]nlike the concept of constructive receipt, the concept of economic benefit emerged in the area of employee compensation, where it continues to be more relevant than in other areas of federal income
taxation." Id.
69. See, e.g., Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977); Pulsifer v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 245 (1975). The development and application of the doctrine outside the
deferred compensation area will be discussed at a later point in this article.
70. While the development of the economic benefit doctrin& occurred primarily as a
result of judicial decisions, certain aspects of the doctrine have been codified in the
Internal Revenue Code. This is particularly true in the area of employee benefits. For
example, I.R.C. § 83 entered the Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and
adopted those aspects of the economic benefit doctrine that applied to property transferred in conjunction with the rendition of services. See supra note 24. Additionally,
I.R.C. § 402(b) currently provides as follows:
Contributions to an employees' trust made by an employer during a taxable year
of the employer which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust for which
the trust is not exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be included in the
gross income of the employee in accordance with section 83 (relating to property
transferred in connection with performance of services), except that the value of
the employee's interest in the trust shall be substituted for the fair market value
of the property for purposes of applying such section. The amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee by any such trust shall be taxable
to him in the year in which so distributed or made available, under section 72
(relating to annuities), except that distributions of income of such trust before
the annuity starting date (as defined in section 72(c)(4)) shall be included in the
gross income of the employee without regard to section 72(e)(5) (relating to
amount not received as annuities). A beneficiary of any such trust shall not be
considered the owner of any portion of such trust under subpart E of part I of
subchapter J (relating to grantors and others treated as substantial owners).
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This growth initially occurred as a result of a number of judicial decisions.
While it is generally accepted that the economic benefit
doctrine developed from the Smith decision, a Tax Court
opinion predating Smith by three years was doctrinally more
significant in the development of the elements of the modern
doctrine than Smith, which primarily provided a title for the
doctrine. In Brodie v. Commissioner,7" the Board of Directors
of a corporation had established a nonqualified plan 72 to provide compensation to select corporate executives.73 Under the
plan the Corporate President determined annually which emI.R.C. § 402(b) (1986) (effective only for plan years beginning before January 1, 1989).
This section operates as a statutory codification of the economic benefit doctrine
where "employee trusts" are involved, and mandates the same income tax consequences
as if the common law economic benefit doctrine had been applied. Curiously, the Treasury in attacking this type of arrangement frequently uses the common law doctrine
rather than I.R.C. § 402(b). See, e.g., Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.
1985). Occasionally, the Treasury will use I.R.C. § 402(b) in tandem with the common
law doctrine. See, e.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 621 (1975). Presumably,
the Treasury and the courts resort to the common law doctrine in preference to the
statute because it reaches the same conclusion but with broader application.
Finally, the Treasury has occasionally attempted to utilize its authority to promulgate interpretive regulations under I.R.C. § 7805 to affirm its view of the economic
benefit doctrine. For example, in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, first proposed in 1978,
the Treasury urged the following interpretation of a common situation:
Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this section, if under a plan or
arrangement (other than a plan or arrangement described in sections 401(a),
403(a) or (b), or 405(a)) payment of an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular
compensation fixed by contract, statute, or otherwise (or supplements to such
compensation, such as bonuses, or increases in such compensation) is, at the
taxpayer's individual option, deferred to a taxable year later than that in which
such amount would have been payable but for his exercise of such option, the
amount shall be treated as received by the taxpayer in such earlier taxable year.
For purposes of this paragraph, it is immaterial that the taxpayer's rights in the
amount payment of which is so deferred become forfeitable by reason of his
exercise of the option to defer payment.
Id. This proposed regulation has never been formally adopted or withdrawn.
71. 1 T.C. 275 (1942). The Treasury recently applied the rationale of the Brodie
case in a private letter ruling. Under the assumed facts of the ruling an attorney had
agreed to pay a sum to a former client in the future in settlement of a claim against the
lawyer. The attorney purchased an annuity in the face amount owed and transferred it
to the client. The Treasury ruled the client was required to include the fair market
value of the annuity in the year it was transferred to him. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 18 021
(Jan. 29, 1987).
72. All future references to "plans" will assume that the plan at issue is not qualified under the provisions of I.R.C. § 401 with the resulting tax benefits that result from
such qualification.
73. Brodie, 1 T.C. at 276.
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ployees were to receive compensation from the fund and in
what amount. 74 In the year at issue the fund purchased paid
up retirement annuity contracts on select employees. 75 These
contracts were then delivered to the benefited employees.76
The employees had no option
to accept cash or alternate bene77
fits in lieu of the annuity.
The Treasury attempted to include the premium cost of
the annuity in the recipient's gross income in the year of
purchase, asserting that the taxpayer was in constructive receipt of the premiums. 78 The Treasury's theory was inappropriate for two reasons. First, the taxpayer was in actual
receipt of the annuity. Second, because the plan participants
and benefits were selected in the discretion of the employer,
the court concluded that the contracts were not subject to inclusion in the employee's gross income under the traditional
requirements of constructive receipt. 79 Nonetheless, without
an exhaustive analysis, the court required the employee to include the premium under the following principle:
While we do not think that the doctrine of constructive receipt as it is commonly understood can be correctly applied
in these proceedings, it is undoubtedly true that the amount
which the Commissioner has included in each petitioner's
income was usedfor his benefit, albeit not at his own direction, in thepurchase of an annuity contract, and the contract
so purchased was issued in the name of the annuitant and
was delivered to him and was part of the plan for his additional remuneration.8 °
Despite the sparseness of reasoning, this case is doctrinally
noteworthy in the development of the economic benefit doctrine because the elements of the current doctrine were factually present in the case. In future decisions, courts isolated
these factual aspects as elements of the doctrine.
Brodie's employer, by purchasing the annuity in his
name, 8 1 established a fund in which Brodie had an interest.
74. Id. at 279.
75. Id. at 277-78.

76. Id. at 279-82.
77. Id. at 276-77 & 281.

78. Id. at 281.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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When the employer unconditionally transferred the annuity to
Brodie the fund became irrevocable and was no longer subject
to the claims of the employer's creditors. Prior to the
purchase of the annuity, Brodie might have had an expectation or a contingent right in being selected for participation in
the plan. This remote interest was not subject to tax. However, once the annuity was purchased and transferred unconditionally to Brodie, his interest in the fund became vested and
nonforfeitable and the value of these rights was easily measured by the employer's costs in acquiring the annuity.
The next significant development in the evolution of the
economic benefit doctrine occurred in Oberwinder v. Commissioner,"2 a case factually similar to Brodie. However, in
Oberwinder, the taxpayer raised an additional argument pertaining to the valuation of the annuity, asserting that the annuity had no cash surrender value. As no market existed for
the annuity, 83 the taxpayer argued that nothing should be included in income in the year of receipt.84 While conceding the
absence of both cash surrender value and a ready market,85
the court required the taxpayer to include the premium cost of
the annuity.8 6 The inclusion occurred because the court determined that the transfer of the annuity to the taxpayer conferred some economic benefit on the recipient:
[I]t does not follow that the contracts were devoid of present
value to petitioners on the date of delivery to them. It can
not be said that on their receipt the petitioners realized no
economic gain. On the delivery of the contracts it was certain that the petitioners or their assigns would eventually receive the full amount expended by the company in the
purchase of the contracts. The lack of an existing market
upon which the contracts might be readily sold is not determinative on the question of value.87

The primary significance of this decision is that the court
required inclusion of the premiums under a theory other than
the cash equivalency doctrine. Subject to the conditions of the
82. 147 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945).

83. Id. at 257.
84. This argument was also asserted and rejected in United States v. Drescher, 179
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950). See supra note 62.
85. Oberwinder, 147 F.2d at 259.

86. Id.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
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Cowden test,8 8 cash equivalency is determined by whether the
obligor's promise to pay is sufficiently marketable to render it
equivalent to cash for tax purposes. 89 The doctrine has no application where a promise of a third party is transferred. A
third party's promise is itself property and if received as part
of a taxable transaction, it would be separately valued and its
fair market value would be included in gross income under
section 1001 of the Code. 90 In Oberwinder, the employer was
not transferring its note to the employee, which possibly might
be within the cash equivalency doctrine, but rather the obligation of a third party insurance company. As a result, the cash
equivalency doctrine could not have required the inclusion of
the premium in the taxpayer's income. Clearly a separate
principle of includibility based on an employee's interest in
property irrevocably transferred by his employer was
emerging.
Even if the employer's promise had been transferred, the
cash equivalency doctrine would not have been applicable.
The basic premise of that doctrine is that certain promises are
so marketable that they become the functional equivalents of
cash. Obviously, the theory is heavily dependent on the existence of some market in which the cash equivalent can be
traded. The Oberwinder court conceded that no market existed for the annuities at issue, but the court still included the
premium cost of the annuities in gross income.
In the succeeding year, the Tax Court in McEwen v. Commissioner91 extended the reach of the developing doctrine
under a fact pattern similar to Oberwinder. In McEwen, the
employer had not actually purchased the annuities on the employee's life but rather had transferred the funds to a trustee
and directed the trustee to purchase the annuity. In an employment contract, the employer agreed to transfer five percent of the company's net earnings above $450,000 in specified
88. For a discussion of Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961) see
text accompanying note 60.
89. See supra notes 32 & 61.

90. Section 1001(b) of the Internal Revenue Code describes the "amount realized"
from a transaction as the "sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the

property (other than money) received." Id.
91. 6 T.C. 1018 (1946).
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years to an institutional trustee. 92 Under the agreement the
trustee was required to invest all assets in annuities for the
benefit of the employee.93 The employer retained no rights in
the trust and the employee's rights were vested and nonforfeitable. 94 Citing Smith, the court required each payment to the
trust to be included in the employee's gross income when
paid:
The amount of $43,934.62 was unconditionally, and pursuant to the request of petitioner, paid in the taxable year 1941
to the trustee for the benefit of petitioner or his family, and
such fund, or the economic or financial benefit flowing therefrom, could not thereafter revert to the employer or be diverted or used for any other purposes.95

In Sproull v. Commissioner,96 the Tax Court applied the
doctrine to an employee benefit other than an annuity. In
Sproull, an employer executed a trust agreement with an institutional trustee. 97 Pursuant to this agreement, the employer
irrevocably transferred a sum of money to a trust as compensation for select employees. 98 This sum was invested by the
trustee but ultimately was to be paid over to the benefited employees in annual installments.99 The Commissioner included
the entire amount paid to the trustee as income to the benefited employee in the year of transfer. " ° After concluding
that the constructive receipt doctrine was inapplicable,' ° the
court stated that its goal was to determine whether "any economic or financial benefit was conferred on the employee as
compensation."' 1 2 In requiring inclusion in the employee's in92. Id. at 1020.
93. Id. at 1021. The trust also permitted the trustee to invest in government securities. However, no funds had been invested in such securities, and that aspect of the
trust was not at issue in the case.
94. Id. at 1025.

95. Id. at 1026.
96. 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
97. Id. at 245.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 246. In a subsequent revenue ruling, the Treasury ruled that under this
type of arrangement the contributions were also subject to federal employment taxes in
the year they were transferred to the trust. See Rev. Rul. 57-37, 1957-1 C.B. 18.
101. Sproull, 16 T.C. at 246-47.

102. Id. at 247.
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come in the year of transfer, the court found the following
economic benefit to the employee as determinative:
Here, we think it must be held that the expenditure of the
$10,500 in setting up the trust conferred an economic or financial benefit on petitioner properly taxable to him in 1945.
The fund was ascertained and paid over by petitioner's employer for his benefit in that year. Petitionerhad to do nothingfurther to earn it or establish his rights therein. The only

duties of the trustees were to hold, invest, accumulate, and
very shortly pay over the fund and its increase to petitioner
or his estate in the event of his prior death.10 3 No one else had
any interest in or control over the monies.

With Sproull, the current elements of the economic benefit
doctrine were established. Thereafter, the litigated cases and
Treasury interpretations served either as refinements 104 or
mere applications of the Sproull standards.10 5 For example, in
Centre v. Commissioner106 an employer agreed to fund an unqualified retirement plan for certain employees.10 7 To underwrite this obligation, the company purchased life insurance
policies on the covered employees. 08 In addition to owning
the policies, the company paid all premiums and was the beneficiary of all of such policies. 109 As a practical matter, the employer agreed to assign eleven such policies to an employee
103. Id. at 247-48 (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Teget v. United States, 552 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1977). Teget involved
a liquidation proceeding where the employer created a trust to fund and administer
certain deferred compensation obligations it owed a particular employee. Prior to the
establishment of the trust, the employee's claims had not been segregated or set aside.
The taxpayer argued that the trust was part of the liquidation under I.R.C. § 337. Applying the provisions of § 402(b), the court required the taxpayer to report the contribution in income in the year it was paid to the trust. Teget, 552 F.2d at 237. See also Rev.
Rul. 55-691, 1955-2 C.B. 21. In this ruling the Treasury applied the doctrine to a situation where personal guarantors of an employee's salary either purchased an annuity and
transferred it to the employee or transferred funds to an irrevocable trust in complete
satisfaction of the guaranty. Id.
105. See, e.g., C. C. Blake, %61,311 T.C.M. (P-H-1961). Without significant analysis, the Tax Court required a taxpayer to include money placed in an escrow account in
compensation for services rendered by merely citing the Sproull decision and concluding that the escrow amount was includible under "established principles." Id. See also
Jacuzzi v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 262 (1973) (classic application of the doctrine involving a deferred compensation arrangement effectuated by a trust).
106. 55 T.C. 16 (1970).
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 17-18.
109. Id. at 17.
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who terminated service with the company before attaining retirement age. 1 ' Centre terminated his employment with the
company and the policies were subsequently transferred to
him."' The taxpayer asserted that the value of the policies
was properly includible in his gross income under the economic benefit doctrine when the employer originally paid the
premiums. 112 Presumably these years were closed by the applicable statute of limitations. During the years in which the
company paid the premiums, the policies were in the possession of the employer and subject to the claims of its creditors. 1 3 On this basis, the court found the economic benefit
doctrine inapplicable:
To constitute taxable income, however, the economic or financial benefit must be conferred on the employee in the tax
year. The naked promise of an employer to pay compensation at some future date for services currently rendered is
not income to a cash basis employee .... Where the insurance remains an asset of the employer to which all creditors
have rights and the employee acquires no immediate rights
thereto, he realizes no114income from the payment of premiums on the insurance.
Under somewhat different facts, the court reached a contrary result in Frost v. Commissioner.115 In Frost the employer
purchased three life insurance policies on its employee, Mr.
Frost.' 16 The employer, the owner and beneficiary of the policies, paid all premiums due on the policies. 17 Subsequently,
the employer transferred the policies to an institutional trustee
to be administered pursuant to the terms of a trust agreement. 8 Unlike Centre, the trust agreement conferred on the
taxpayer certain rights in the policies.11 9 Specifically, the
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 19.
113. Id. at 19-20. See also Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957)
(holding that the economic benefit doctrine was not triggered by the mere purchase of
an insurance contract by an employer on the life of an employee, if the policy was not

placed in a separate fund in which the employee had vested rights).
114. Centre, 55 T.C. at 19-20.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

52 T.C. 89 (1969).
Id. at 90-93.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
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court found the taxpayer had the right to receive "either the
cash surrender value, the retirement benefits accruing under
said policies, or the face value
upon the happening of any one
' 120
of several future events."
In determining that these rights conferred a "present economic benefit" on the taxpayer, the court concluded that the
taxpayer was assured of a minimum benefit measured by the
cash surrender value of the policies. 121 As a result, the court
concluded that the taxpayer had a "vested and nonforfeitable"' 122 interest in the policies, and upheld the Commissioner's determination to include the premiums in Frost's
gross income for the taxable years in which they were paid. 123
The elements of the economic benefit doctrine were established as an equitable judicial response to the distortions created by the inherent nature of cash method accounting.
However, once the courts established the elements of the doctrine, the Treasury applied the doctrine in a number of employment-related settings not previously addressed by court
decision. Many of these applications were set forth in private
letter rulings. While technically such rulings have no precedential value, 124 they do reveal the inclination of the Treasury
120. Id.
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 98. The principles enunciated in the Frost case have been applied in a
number of interesting factual situations. In Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810
(Ct. Cl. 1978), the court reached a similar result where an employer had promised certain benefits to an employee. While the employer was not an insurance company, the
benefits it promised were analogous to insurance benefits. As the employee was guaranteed minimum payments, the court determined that the employee had certain vested
rights in the benefits which could be valued by reference to the cost of comparable
commercial insurance.
See also Rev. Rul. 55-691, 1955-2 C.B. 21. The Treasury applied the economic benefit doctrine to require the employee to immediately include in income a lump sum.
This lump sum was to be irrevocably paid by the individual guarantors of the taxpayer's
employment contract either to a trustee on his behalf, or for the purchase of an annuity
contract. The purpose of the contemplated transfer was to discharge the guarantors'
personal liability.
124. Under well established principles of law, private letter rulings have no precedential value. See I.R.C. § 6110(p)(3). Generally, they do not operate to effect an estoppel against the government on behalf of a non-addressee of the ruling. See
Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966). A narrow exception to this general rule is found in International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
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in a particular matter. This is particularly true where the ruling is consistent with case law and prior rulings.
For example, in Private Letter Ruling 81 13 107,125 the
Treasury applied the economic benefit doctrine to a deferred
compensation arrangement that is now colloquially referred to
as a "Rabbi Trust." 126 Under the assumed facts of the ruling,
a synagogue proposed to transfer funds to a trust established
for the benefit of its rabbi. 2 7 While the synagogue could not
alter or amend any provision of the trust, the trust res re2 8
mained subject to the claims of the synagogue's creditors.
The rabbi's interest, while seemingly vested in him, could not
be assigned or pledged by him and was not subject to the

129
claims of his creditors.
After observing that the economic benefit doctrine was at
issue, the Treasury concluded that a fund had not been created that would trigger the application of the doctrine. As the
assets of the trust were subject to the claims of the congregation's creditors, 30 the congregation could not be viewed as
3
having "irrevocably" placed the funds with a third party.' '
Presumably, this failure also prevented the rabbi from receiving a vested and nonforfeitable interest in the fund. As a result, the principal and interest of the trust could only be
included in the rabbi's gross income in the year he actually
32
received it, or when it was otherwise made available to him.

125. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81 13 107 (Dec. 31, 1980).
126. As the facts of the private letter ruling request pertained to a rabbi, this type
of deferred compensation is generally referred to as a "Rabbi Trust." A recent article
indicates that this nomenclature has been carried over to other deferred compensation
arrangements. Bennet, Protecting Unsecured Pensions and Pay Becomes a Priorityfor
Firm Under Fire, Wall St. J.,
May 21, 1987, at 31, col. 4. The article goes on to describe
a "Secular Trust" as follows: "These trusts which are named to distinguish them from
rabbi trusts, provide protection from both takeovers and bankruptcy filings. That's because money contributed to secular trusts is immediately vested in the name of the
beneficiaries who are thus protected from creditors." Id. Under this type of arrangement the beneficiary would be required to include the fund in gross income in the year
of transfer.
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81 13 107 (Dec. 31, 1980).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. See also, Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B
127 (Treasury reached a similar result holding under similar facts that the employees
did not have a present interest in the funds).
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Likewise, in Private Letter Ruling 83 25 100,133 an employer inquired as to the tax consequences of a nonqualified
1 34
deferred compensation plan maintained by an employer.
Under the provisions of the plan, all plan assets remained
within the control of the employer and remained subject to
the claims of the employer's creditors. 135 The Treasury, consistent with its prior ruling in Private Letter Ruling 81 13 107,
concluded that the economic benefit doctrine was inapplicable. As the plan's assets had not been irrevocably placed beyond the reach of the employer's creditors, the doctrine did
not apply. 136 Following these two rulings, 137 the Treasury issued a plethora 138 of similar rulings wherein it concluded that
the vulnerability of trust assets to the creditors of the employer was sufficient to defeat the application of the39economic
benefit doctrine to nonqualified employee benefits.1
133. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83 24 100 (Mar. 23, 1983).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In a subsequent ruling, the Treasury observed that where a nonqualified plan
provided for separate accounts for employees, the explicit provisions of I.R.C.
§ 404(a)(5) authorized the employer/grantor to deduct the payments in the year in
which they were included in the beneficiary/employee's gross income. See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8602039 (Oct. 15, 1985).
138. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 27 028 (Apr. 3, 1987) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 72 5036
(Mar. 28, 1987) (relating to the use of trusts to fund nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 22 035 (Feb. 27, 1987) (relating to unfunded nonqualifled deferred compensation agreements between a corporate employer and its president);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 02 021 (Oct. 10, 1986) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 02 021 (Oct. 10, 1986)
and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 11 033 (Dec. 12, 1986) (relating to Supplementary Retirement
Plans); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87 03 063 (Nov. 28, 1986) (relating to a deferred compensation
plan for a nonprofit corporation); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86 41 039 (July 15, 1986) (relating to a
deferred compensation plan for a bank); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84 39 012 (June 22, 1984) (relating to a deferred compensation plan); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84 18 105 (Jan. 3, 1984) (relating
to a Supplementary Retirement Income Plan); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84 06 012 (Nov. 3, 1983)
(relating to the proposed purchase of a surety to secure payment of a nonqualified Executive Bonus Plan); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39-230 (May 7, 1984) (relating to a Supplementary Retirement Income Plan). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 37256 (Sept. 15, 1977) (The
General Counsel concluded that the economic benefit doctrine was inapplicable to a
deferred compensation arrangement where the implementing trust was revocable at the
discretion of the employer.).
139. In a number of instances, the Treasury originally urged an expanded interpretation of the economic benefit doctrine and subsequently changed its interpretation.
For example, in Gen. Couns. Mem. 35196 (Jan. 16, 1973), the General Counsel's office
argued for an interpretative expansion of the economic benefit doctrine. Specifically,
the General Counsel argued that where amounts were withheld from a federal employee's salary and placed in the Civil Service Retirement Fund with matched govern-
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The most recent judicial discussion of the economic benefit
doctrine in the deferred compensation area occurred in Minor
v. United States.14° In Minor the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the taxpayer, frustrating the efforts of the Treasury to expand the economic
benefit doctrine to reach certain innovative nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. As this case reflects the
most recent judicial pronouncement of the economic benefit
doctrine and therefore may provide some insight into the future of the doctrine, this decision will be explored in some
detail.
In Minor, the taxpayer was a physician practicing
medicine pursuant to an agreement with the Snohomish
County Physicians Corporation. 14 1 Under the agreement the

taxpayer promised to render medical services to subscribers in
the corporation's prepaid medical plan in exchange for scheduled fees. 142 Subsequent to the execution of the original agreement, the corporation adopted a deferred compensation plan
for participating physicians. 143 Pursuant to this plan the taxpayer executed a supplemental agreement with the corporation, whereby he elected to receive only a portion of the
scheduled fee with the balance of the fee paid to the deferred
compensation fund on his behalf. 144
mental funds, the amount withheld from the employee's gross income should be
included in gross income in the year of deduction under the economic benefit doctrine.
This would have been a considerable expansion of the application of the doctrine for the
following reasons:
1. The employee rather than the employer would have been the source of the funds at
issue.
2. The Civil Service Fund was not fully funded and had $50 billion of unfunded
liability.
3. The Civil Service Retirement Fund was a qualified trust under I.R.C. § 401(a) and
exempt from federal income tax under § 501(a).
Upon reconsideration the Chief Counsel's office changed its mind about precipitously
expanding the economic benefit doctrine in this fashion. In Gen. Couns. Mem. 35326
(May 3, 1973), the Chief Counsel retreated from this position in the following language:
"In view of G.C.M. 35096 and the qualified exempt trust status of the Civil Service
Fund, we do not think an economic benefit argument should be made in the subject
case." Id.

140. 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
141. Id. at 1473.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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To effectuate this nonqualified plan, the corporation established a trust in which participating physicians were named as
trustees with the corporation technically designated as the
beneficiary of the trust.145 Apparently, a separate account was
maintained for each physician, and the trustee purchased annuities to fund the payment of benefits under the plan.14 6 Benefits were payable when the participating physician died,
became disabled or left the service area to practice elsewhere.14 7 As part of their agreement the participating physicians agreed to continue to provide services to the
corporation, to render post-retirement consulting services as
requested, and to refrain
from providing medical services to
48
competing groups.

The taxpayer, in computing his income for each year at
issue, omitted the deferred fees from income. 149 The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, arguing that the deferred fees
were includible when earned in the taxpayer's income under
the economic benefit doctrine. 150
The court observed that the primary focus of the economic
benefit doctrine is to determine whether an employer's promise to pay deferred compensation in the future is currently taxable."' In the court's view such benefits were immediately
taxable only if they were capable of current valuation. 152 In
referring to Revenue Ruling 60-3 1,153 the court concluded
that such valuation was only possible where the following familiar elements were present: "A current economic benefit is
capable of valuation where the employer makes a contribution
to an employee's deferred compensation plan which is nonforfeitable, fully vested in the employee and secured
against the
154
arrangement."'
trust
a
by
creditors
employer's
From this definitional foundation, the court concluded
that the deferred fees were not included in the taxpayer's in145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150. Id.

151. Id. at 1474.
152. Id.
153. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 179.
154. Minor, 772 F.2d at 1474.
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come in the year the fees were paid to the trust for three reasons. First, the court determined that under governing state
law, a spendthrift provision did not protect trust assets from
the settlor's creditors where the trust was established for the
settlor's benefit.' 55 As the corporation was technically designated the trust beneficiary, the court concluded that trust assets remained subject to the corporation's creditors under
state law.' 56
Second, the court determined that the taxpayer had no
vested interest in the fund because the participating physicians
were not the designated beneficiaries of the trust:
In this case Snohomish Physicians is both the settlor and the
beneficiary of the trust. Minor's only involvement is as one

of the trustees. Because Snohomish Physicians' trust was
not established in favor of Minor or the other plan participants, the deferred compensation plan is unfunded. Unfunded plans do not confer a present taxable economic
1
benefit. 57

Third, the court determined that the taxpayer's receipt of
benefits under the plan was contingent on his limiting his
practice after retirement and therefore refraining from competing with the corporation.' 58 From this finding the court
concluded that the taxpayer's rights in the benefits were forfeitable. The court deferred to the trial court's finding that the
59
risk was substantial. 1
The court's tripartite reasoning is unsettling for a number
of reasons. At the heart of the court's reasoning is its unflinching acquiescence in viewing the corporation as the true
beneficiary of the deferred compensation arrangement. From
this threshold the court concluded that the fund was subject
to the corporation's creditors and that the taxpayer had no
vested interest in the trust. However, under the deferred compensation plan, the only potential benefits derived by the cor155. The Washington Revised Code specifically provides -[t]hat all deeds of gift,
all conveyances, and all transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels or
things in action, made in trust for the use of the person making the same, shall be void
as against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person." WASH. REV. CODE

§ 19.36.020 (1970).
156.
157.
158.
159.

Minor, 772 F.2d at 1475.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1475-76.
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poration were the post-retirement consulting services of a
retired physician. Even these services had to be specifically
requested. Aside from these services the retired physicians
only covenanted not to compete against the corporation in the
post-retirement years. On the other hand, the participating
physician was entitled to receive the deferred fees that he
elected to have set aside plus accrued interest. With this perthe
spective, it is difficult to conclude as the court did, that
160
taxpayer's "only" interest in the trust was as a trustee.
Despite these facts, the court concluded that the corporation was the beneficiary of the trust, and that although the
taxpayer "incidently benefits from the trust, he is not a beneficiary." ' 161 The court's slavish acceptance of the trust instrument's designation of the corporation as the beneficiary of the
arrangement appears to exault form at the expense of substance. Under well-established principles of income tax law,
the court was free to disregard the state law characterization
of property interests, if necessary to give tax effect to the substance of the transaction.1 62 Under these facts, the court
could have concluded on a "substance over form" analysis
that the participating physicians were the actual beneficiaries
of the trust. After all, their fees funded the trust, and they
were the ultimate recipients of benefits under the plan. While
such a conclusion would have represented an expansion of the
economic benefit doctrine, it would have been an expansion
that was consistent with the equitable purposes of the
doctrine.
Next, the court distinguished two prior Treasury rulings
on similar issues in a footnote.1 63 The court concluded that
160. This is particularly true where the net effect of such a determination is to
confer on the taxpayer many of the tax preferred benefits of a qualified plan without the

vigorous qualification and anti-discrimination requirement of a qualified plan. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 401.
161. Minor, 772 F.2d at 1475.
162. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Court
Holding Co., the Court stated:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction .... To
permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms,
which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.
Id. at 334.
163. Minor, 772 F.2d at 1474 n.1.
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Revenue Rulings 69-50164 and 77-42016' were inapplicable to

the case because the "essence of those rulings was that the
physician had constructively received the income before assigning it to the deferred compensation agreement."'' 66 In
both of the referenced rulings, the Treasury ruled that a physician was required to currently report fees which he had voluntarily deferred as income. In summarizing the earlier ruling,
Revenue Ruling 77-420 described the reasoning of both as
follows:
Rev. Rul. 69-50 holds that the physician must include the
deferred amounts in gross income for the year in which they
are withheld by the corporation, because the physician's
right to the compensation payments emanates from the medical services that are rendered to the patients insured by the
corporation. The patients compensate the physician for the
services by investing the physician with the right to compensation payments from the corporation. In effect the patients
have funded their obligation to the physician with the corporation, thereby conferring an economic or financial benefit
on the physician. 117

In Revenue Ruling 77-420, this result was unaffected by the
fact that the physician's benefits were subject to forfeiture to
16 8
the corporation.

While the court was not bound by the Treasury's interpretation of the economic benefit doctrine in their rulings, 169 the
rulings had reflected settled Treasury interpretation of the
economic benefit doctrine for a significant period of time. The
casual distinction the court made in the referenced footnote in
disregarding the rulings is singularly unsatisfying. To most
readers the case is indistinguishable from the assumed facts of
the referenced rulings.
While not particularly damaging to the doctrinal integrity
of the economic benefit doctrine, the Minor case would appear
to inhibit any immediate attempts by the Treasury to rapidly
164.
165.
166.
167.

Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172.
Minor, 772 F.2d at 1474 n. 1.
Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172-73.

168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47
(5th Cir. 1971) (the court described a revenue ruling as "merely the opinion of a lawyer
in the agency and must be accepted as such").
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expand the reach of the doctrine. Ironically, as a result of the
rate restructuring that occurred in the 1986 Tax Reform Act,
the arrangement involved in Minor would no longer appear to
be tax advantageous. 170 While the Treasury may have lost a
skirmish in Minor, it appears they may have garnered an ultimate victory as a result of this congressional action.
Much of the economic benefit doctrine developed in employment-related matters. However, while this was occurring
the Treasury was also aggressively applying the doctrine in
other settings.
B.

Prizes and Awards

The first application of the economic benefit doctrine
outside the deferred compensation area occurred in Revenue
Ruling 62-74.171 Under the assumed facts of that ruling the
taxpayer won a door prize of "12x" dollars.17 2 Pursuant to
contest rules, the prize was to be paid on an installment basis. 173 The sponsor placed the sum of "12x" dollars into a
non-interest bearing account. 174 Although not specified, it
was apparent that the funds were irrevocably deposited in the
escrow beyond the reach of the sponsor's creditors. The taxpayer was to immediately receive "2.5x" dollars from the escrow account. 175 Four months after this initial payment the
taxpayer was to receive an additional "5x" dollars from the
fund, with the balance of "4.5x" dollars to be received one
year after the creation of the escrow. 17 6 After stating that the
award itself was taxable under the provisions of section 74 of
170. As a result of the court's reasoning the deferred fees were not included in the
income of the physician who earned them. However, once placed in the trust they were

subject to the claims of the corporation's creditors. As a result, the fees and any interest
earned on them were included in the gross income of the corporation under the Grantor
Trust Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 671-79. Prior to the 1986
Act this was a tax advantaged situation because a tax was imposed against corporate

income at generally lower overall rates than individual income. In the 1986 Act, this
advantage for corporate income was eliminated. Corporate income is currently taxed at
higher overall rates then individual income. See generally I.R.C. §§ I & 11. As a result,
the arrangement in Minor would no longer appear attractive.
171. Rev. Rul. 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68.
172. Id.
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Id.
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the Code, the Treasury concluded that the time in which the
award was to be included in income was controlled by the
economic benefit doctrine as enunciated in the Sproull decision. The ruling noted that in both instances a fund had been
established from which installment payments were ultimately
made to the benefited taxpayer.17 7 Pursuing the Sproull analogy, the ruling determined that the only "substantial" difference between the two cases was that in Sproull the fund was
interest bearing and that the accrued interest was ultimately
paid to the taxpayer. 17 8 Undeterred by this distinction, the

ruling prophetically applied time value of money concepts in
concluding that unlike Sproull the entire principal of the fund
did not have to be included in gross income in the year of the
creation of the prize; the winner was only obligated to include
the "2.5x" dollars he actually received in that year plus the
present value of the right to receive the installment payments
in succeeding years.1 7 9 This present value was determined by
estate tax regulations. The difference between the full amount
of actual payments made and their discounted value was to be
included in the prize winner's income as interest when actually received. 8 "
Several general observations concerning Revenue Ruling
62-74 are appropriate. First, while the ruling asserts that the
Sproull decision is controlling, it cites the following portion of
that opinion which suggests a more limited applicability:
"The question then becomes * * * was 'any economic or finan-

cial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation' in the
taxable year."''
Concededly, the funding arrangements present in both
Sproull and the ruling were analogous. Presumably, this similarity motivated the Treasury to attempt to expand the application of the economic benefit doctrine outside of
employment relationships. Notwithstanding this similarity,
the application of the doctrine to prizes and awards consti177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 247
(1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (1952).
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tuted a more significant expansion of the doctrine than the
language of the ruling implies.
Second, the escrow agent was obligated to make
mandatory payments in accordance with a schedule established in the escrow agreement. As a result, the assumed facts
of the ruling were highly analogous to other mandatory installment obligations which had previously been held subject
to the economic benefit doctrine. Therefore, the facts of the
ruling were more conducive to a limited expansion of the economic benefit doctrine than they would have been had the escrow agent possessed any discretion over the payment of
installments. However, when the issue of discretionary payments arose in custodial account and guardianship settings,
Revenue Ruling 62-74 served as a conceptual bridge for the
application of the doctrine to those different settings.
A detailed discussion of the Treasury's reasoning in extending the economic benefit doctrine to nondeferred compensation arrangements appears in a General Counsel
Memorandum dated November 21, 1966. In General Counsel
Memorandum 33733,182 the Chief Counsel's office reviewed a

proposed revenue ruling that had been submitted to it for concurrence or comment. The proposed ruling addressed the tax
consequences of the following assumed facts.
A taxpayer purchased an Irish Sweepstakes ticket for himself, his wife and his two minor children.1 83 The ticket subsequently won a cash prize.184 Under controlling Irish law, each
minor's winnings had to be deposited with the Irish courts
until each minor attained majority. 185 Prior to majority, each
minor's fund could be invaded as necessary to pay for the minor's medical, educational or similar expenses. 186 The proposed revenue ruling concluded that the winnings were not
included in the minor's gross income until such time as the
funds were made available to the minor or majority was attained.1 87 Finding itself unable to concur in this result, the
Chief Counsel's office urged that a revision of the proposed
182. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966). See supra notes 27 & 123.
183. Id.

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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ruling require immediate inclusion in the minor's gross income in the year in which the winnings were placed with the
court.188 This inclusion was predicated exclusively on the application of the economic benefit doctrine.
This General Counsel Memorandum is particularly enlightening because it represents the most comprehensive discussion of the economic benefit doctrine in any opinion or
ruling to date. Additionally, its frequent citation in succeeding rulings clearly identifies it as the Treasury's seminal
statement on this issue.
The General Counsel Memorandum summarizes the economic benefit doctrine in language which has become a regulatory standard for defining the doctrine.
The principle generally known as the "economic benefit"
doctrine delimits one form of property the fair market value
of which must be included in gross income. Pursuant to this
theory, the creation by an obligor of a fund in which the
taxpayer has vested rights will result in immediate inclusion
by the taxpayer of the amount funded. A "fund" is created
when an amount is irrevocably placed with a third party,
and a taxpayer's interest in such a fund is "vested" if it is
nonforfeitable.' 89
The General Counsel Memorandum interprets the Sproull
decision, by focusing on its conclusion that the establishment
of a fund on behalf of a third party constitutes such an economic and financial benefit that it justifies the immediate in0
clusion of the fund in the benefited taxpayer's gross income. 19
By this analysis the General Counsel Memorandum isolated
the legal analysis of the Sproull case from the employer/employee setting in which it arose.
In comparing the assumed facts of the proposed ruling
with those contained in Revenue Ruling 62-74, the General
Counsel Memorandum noted that the installment payout of
the award was a pre-established condition of the contest in the
prior ruling.' 9' However, under the assumed facts of the General Counsel Memorandum, the minor was denied the immediate payment of the funds, not as a condition of the contest,
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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but as a result of substantive domestic relations law. 192 Further, under the facts of Revenue Ruling 62-74, the installment
payout was unalterable, while under the facts of the General
Counsel Memorandum, the deferred payments could be accelerated to meet the medical or educational needs of the minor. 193 Despite these significant factual differences, the
General Counsel Memorandum harmonized these distinctions
by indulging in a presumption of constructive knowledge on
behalf of the minor:
For economic benefit purposes, it is immaterial whether a
taxpayer enters a contest with actual knowledge of a deferred payment arrangement required by the contest sponsors, as in Rev. Rul. 62-74, or with constructive knowledge
of governing law which requires 94a deferred payment arrangement, as in the instant case.'
With this understated but nonetheless sweeping pronouncement, the Treasury removed the last conceptual barrier
to the application of the economic benefit doctrine to a variety
of differing situations. These situations included instances
where funds were established for the ultimate benefit of minors including prizes and judicial awards and settlements
from damage actions.
On a different issue, General Counsel Memorandum 33733
also reasserted that assignability of the benefit was not an essential element of the economic benefit doctrine.195 In raising
this issue, the General Counsel Memorandum attempted to
distinguish the economic benefit doctrine from the cash
equivalency doctrine. While a ready market and unfettered
assignability are essential to cash equivalency, 96 the Treasury
concluded they are not essential to the economic benefit doctrine. As might be expected, this subtle distinction between
similar theories has frequently confused the courts. 97 The
proposed revenue ruling had fallen prey to this confusion and
had held that as the minor could not assign his interest in the

192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

196. See supra notes 32 & 61.

197. See supra notes 33, 61, and 62 and accompanying text.
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court administered funds, the economic benefit doctrine did
not apply.
In enunciating its position, the General Counsel Memorandum attributed any confusion concerning assignability in
applying the economic benefit doctrine to the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Drysdale v. Commissioner."' In that case, the court held that the absence of an
assignability feature made the economic benefit doctrine inapplicable. In rejecting assignability as an element of the economic benefit doctrine, the General Counsel Memorandum
cited extensively to previous rulings and cases where the economic benefit doctrine was applied but assignability was either
not referred to as an issue or was specifically rejected as an
element of the test.1 99 In attempting to reject the assignability
issue with finality, the General Counsel Memorandum characterized the Drysdale opinion as follows:
This view is contrary to the position of the Tax Court suggested by the above-cited cases, and finds no support in any
opinion of another Circuit Court. Accordingly, it should be
viewed as an aberration in the development of the economic
benefit doctrine limited in significance to the Circuit in
which it was postulated. 200
In the wake of General Counsel Memorandum 33733, the
Treasury issued Revenue Ruling 67-203.20

This ruling, con-

sistent with General Counsel Memorandum 33733, applied
the economic benefit doctrine to require a minor to immediately include sweepstake winnings in income, even though
those funds were withheld and administered under local law
2
20
by a court.

The Chief Counsel's position in General Counsel Memorandum 33733 subsequently received judicial sanction by the
Tax Court in Pulsifer v. Commissioner. °3 Pulsifer dealt with
the precise factual situation which had served as the model for
General Counsel Memorandum 33733. In Pulsifer, a minor
won the Irish Sweepstakes and his winnings were placed with
198. 277 F.2d 413 (1960), rev'g, 32 T.C. 378 (1959).

199. Gen. Couns. Mer. 33733 (Nov. 21, 1966).
200. Id.
201. Rev. Rul. 67-203, 1967-1 C.B. 105.
202. Id.
203. 64 T.C. 245 (1975).
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the Irish Court pending his majority.2" The government and
taxpayer agreed that the prize money itself was subject to inclusion under section 74 of the Code. 20 - The only issue
presented was the proper time for such inclusion. The Commissioner argued for immediate inclusion in the year the funds
were deposited with the court, while the taxpayer sought to
defer inclusion until the year of actual receipt. 0 6 Citing Revenue Ruling 67-203, the Tax Court applied the economic benefit doctrine to require the minor to include the prize in the
year in which it was deposited with the court.20 7 Although
the Tax Court's analysis is scanty, it characterized the economic benefit doctrine as follows:
Under the economic-benefit theory, an individual on the
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting is
currently taxable on the economic and financial benefit derived from the absolute right to income in the form of a fund
which has been irrevocably set aside for him in trust and is
beyond the reach of the payor's debtors.208
The Pulsifer decision is the first instance in which the Tax
Court adopted the Treasury's extension of the economic benefit doctrine to nonemployment related matters. The court's
decision also addressed the assignability issue that had troubled the drafters of General Counsel Memorandum 33733. In
Pulsifer, the taxpayer argued that his inability to assign his
interest in the judicially administered fund rendered the economic benefit doctrine inapplicable. 20 9 Adopting the reasoning of General Counsel Memorandum 33733, the court
announced that assignability was irrelevant as the "result is
the same whether or not the right to the funds is
' '2 0
assignable. 1
Two years later in Anastasio v. Commissioner,2 1 the Tax
Court had occasion to revisit the application of the economic
benefit doctrine to prize winnings. In that case, a minor won a
204. Id. at 245-46.
205. Id. at 246.
206. Id.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 247.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id.
67 T.C. 814 (1977).
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$100,000 prize in the New York state lottery. 12 Under New
York law the award was delivered to his parents who invested
the proceeds as custodians under the New York version of the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.213 In essence, the issue arose as
to whether the economic benefit doctrine required the taxpayer to include the award in gross income in the year it was
placed in the custodial account or when it was actually received by the minor.214 Finding Pulsifer dispositive, the Tax
in the year of the creation of the cusCourt required2 inclusion
15
todial account.
Aside from its reinforcement of the government's position
in Pulsifer, the Anastasio case is significant for two additional
reasons. First, the court addressed the assignability issue and
found it simply irrelevant to an economic benefit analysis.
The court stated that "[t]he mere absence of a right to assign
has long been held not to constitute a valid reason for reaching a different result."2 6 Second, the court affirmatively distinguished the constructive receipt doctrine, "a concept that
significantly differs from the theory of economic benefit...
always been
although admittedly the decided cases have not
217
distinction.
the
of
respect
in
clarity
of
models
With these two decisions, the Tax Court fully embraced
the Treasury's expansive interpretation of the economic benefit doctrine and applied it to a number of nonemployment related situations. Moreover, when read in conjunction with
Pulsifer and Anastasio, General Counsel Memorandum 33733
clearly enumerated a theory of tax law which was conceptually different from long standing concepts of cash
equivalency and constructive receipt. The elements of the
economic benefit doctrine had become well-settled.2 1 8 Logi-

212. Id. at 815.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 815-16.
215. Id. at 817.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citation omitted).
218. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85 52 022 (Sept. 25, 1985), the Treasury ruled that the
economic benefit doctrine did not require a lottery winner to include the cost of an
annuity in income where the winner had agreed to an installment payment in the event
he won, and where the lottery funded its obligation to pay the installments by purchasing an annuity which was retained as a general asset of the lottery.
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cally, the Treasury could be expected to expand this doctrine
to yet other areas of law.
C. PersonalInjury Awards
The Pulsifer and Anastasio cases dealt with instances
where prize money had been set aside, subject to judicial supervision, for the benefit of minors. This situation was analogous to instances where a damage or settlement award was
placed in an account, subject to judicial supervision, pending a
minor's attainment of majority. Awards of this type appeared
to be the next logical target of the Treasury's expansion of the
economic benefit doctrine.
In Private Letter Ruling 740 60 70 300A,2 19 it appeared as
if the Treasury had focused on this new target. That ruling
described the income tax consequences of a judicially supervised fund that invested the proceeds of a personal injury verdict awarded to a minor.22° Under the assumed facts of the
ruling a thirteen year old boy sustained an injury which resulted in the loss of an eye and other bodily harm. 221 A lawsuit filed on his behalf ultimately resulted in a $50,000
judgment.222 After payment of the minor's attorney, the sum
of $33,333.34 was paid to the district court clerk who, pursuant to court order, deposited the proceeds in frozen accounts
on behalf of the minor.223 The deposited funds were then utilized to purchase five year certificates of deposit. 224 The invested funds were to remain in the account until either the
minor attained majority or the court ordered an earlier
distribution.225
While many dissimilarities exist between this fact pattern
and the one discussed in General Counsel Memorandum
33733, there was one fundamental difference. In General
Counsel Memorandum 33733, the proceeds of the prize were
unquestionably includible in gross income under section 74 of
the Code. However, under the facts of Private Letter Ruling
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 740 6070 300A (June 7, 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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740 6070 300A, the damage award itself was unquestionably
excludible from the minor's gross income under the provisions
of section 104(a)(2) of the Code which excludes from gross
income "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
pay22 6
ments) on account of personal injuries or sickness.
As a result of this exclusionary provision, the inquiry
posed by the taxpayer in the ruling request was dual. First,
the taxpayer sought reaffirmation of his conclusion that the
award itself was excludible from gross income under section
104(a)(2) of the Code. Second, the taxpayer sought the Treasury's advice as to the proper income tax treatment of the interest accruing on the damage award.
Not surprisingly, the Treasury ruled that the provisions of
section 104(a)(2) operated to exclude the full $50,000 of damages from gross income. On the issue of interest accruing on
the fund, the Treasury first summarized the economic benefit
doctrine: "Under the doctrine, any amounts irrevocably set
aside for the exclusive benefit and ultimate use and enjoyment
of a taxpayer are includible in the taxpayer's gross income at
the time such amounts are so set aside,
provided the rights to
' ' 22 7
these amounts are nonforfeitable.
From this foundation, the Treasury applied the economic
benefit doctrine and concluded that as the interest on the certificate of deposit was "earned and credited, ' 228 it immediately
became includible in the minor's gross income.229
At this juncture it appeared that the Treasury would continue its expansion of the economic benefit doctrine where
such awards were present. Then a surprising and seemingly
inexplicable development stopped this expansion. The Assistant Commissioner had proposed to issue Revenue Ruling 76226. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The operation of this section, particularly the provision
relating to periodic payments is discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this Article
which examines the future of the economic benefit doctrine. See infra notes 345-50 and
accompanying text. See generally Frolik, The Convergence of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy
"Derailed," 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565 (1983). This article argues that I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) reflects bad policy and that the economic benefit doctrine should be applied to
damage settlements without the special rule of IRC § 104(a)(2).
227. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 740 6070 300A (June 7, 1974).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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133 which was factually similar to the assumed facts of Private Letter Ruling 740 6070 300A. 230 The proposed ruling
would have reiterated the reasoning of Private Letter Ruling
740 6070 300A by concluding that the damage award itself
was excluded from gross income under the provisions of section 104(a)(2) of the Code, but that any interest earned on the
fund was includible in the minor's gross income in the year in
which it was credited to the minor's account. The proposed
ruling was routinely submitted to the Chief Counsel's office
for concurrence or comment.
In General Counsel Memorandum 36093,231 the Chief
Counsel disagreed with the proposed ruling's application of
the economic benefit doctrine and urged that it be revised.
Specifically, the General Counsel Memorandum interpreted
Revenue Ruling 67-203 and Sproull as differentiating between
principal and interest in applying the economic benefit doctrine.232 General Counsel Memorandum 36093 characterized
this differentiation as "historical. ' 233 Asserting this distinction, General Counsel Memorandum 36093 concluded the
2 34
economic benefit doctrine was not applicable to interest.
Nonetheless, the General Counsel Memorandum concluded
that the accruing interest was required to be ratably included
in the gross income of the minor under the then existing provisions of section 1232 of the Code.235
The primary thrust of the Chief Counsel's argument in
General Counsel Memorandum 36093 was that neither Revenue Ruling 67-203 nor Sproull addressed the accrual of interest on the funds involved in those cases. The General Counsel
Memorandum concluded that the taxpayers in neither instance were specifically required to include in gross income
the interest accruing on the funds.236 While this conclusion
was questionable, the General Counsel Memorandum interpreted the absence of any discussion of interest in these rulings
230. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36093 (Nov. 29, 1974).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.

235. Id. I.R.C. § 1232 was subsequently repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
The successor provisions to this statute can be found in I.R.C. § 1271-74.
236. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36093 (Nov. 29, 1974).
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as supporting its position that the economic benefit doctrine
had never previously been applied to interest. Having built
this argument on this questionable foundation, the General
Counsel Memorandum then labelled its new analysis as the
"historical" approach.237 Consistent with this analysis, the
Treasury promulgated a revised Revenue Ruling 76-133238
which did not even refer to the economic benefit doctrine. Instead, the ruling required the minor to ratably report the accruing interest under the principles of then existing section
1232 of the Code.
Any attempt to logically explain the rather significant diversion of theory that is reflected in Revenue Ruling 76-133
and General Counsel Memorandum 36093 would be pure
speculation. However, it is puzzling that the Treasury would
exhibit such reluctance to apply a doctrine which it previously
aggressively promoted. The reasoning of the General Counsel
Memorandum does suggest one possible explanation. As discussed above, Private Letter Ruling 7406070300A had specifically applied the economic benefit doctrine to interest in the
year in which it was "credited" to the minor's account. As
General Counsel Memorandum 36093 suggests, all prior rulings and cases which had applied the economic benefit doctrine had exclusively addressed the tax consequences of the
fund itself. Presumably, the Chief Counsel was apprehensive
that a literal application of the economic benefit doctrine to
interest would have only required the inclusion of interest in
gross income when it was actually credited to the minor's account. Assuming this interpretation is accurate, there must
have been some concern that the application of the economic
benefit doctrine to interest would have rendered the ratable
inclusion provisions of the Code inapplicable to accounts in
which the economic benefit doctrine applied.
Assuming this to have been the Chief Counsel's concern,
the risk was really quite minimal. The provisions of section
1232 discussed in General Counsel Memorandum 36093 and
Revenue Ruling 76-133 were merely timing provisions which
attempted to require taxpayers to report interest income
evenly over the time in which it was earned. This timing con237. Id.
238. Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34.
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cept was not fundamentally inconsistent with the economic
benefit doctrine. As a result, Revenue Ruling 76-133 could
have concluded that the economic benefit doctrine required
the minor to report the interest earned on the fund. Moreover, it could have stated that the minor would have to report
this interest in a manner consistent with section 1232. For
whatever reason, the General Counsel Memorandum 36093
eschewed this simple approach, slowed the expansion of this
pro-Treasury doctrine and added a degree of theoretical confusion to the developing tax theory.
If General Counsel Memorandum 36093 and Revenue
Ruling 76-133 can be characterized as somewhat peculiar, the
apparent resolution of the issues they presented is equally peculiar. In Private Letter Ruling 78 39 075,239 the Treasury
revisited the interest issue. Under the assumed facts of the
Private Letter Ruling, a minor instituted a medical malpractice action against certain physicians and a hospital asserting
that her blindness was attributable to their negligence. 240 The
case was settled and the compromised amount was placed
under court supervision in time deposit accounts with maturity dates of four to seven years. 24 1 The accounts were renewable by the minor's guardian, but upon attaining majority the
minor had full access to all principal and interest. 42 Under
the terms of the time deposit accounts, interest was accrued
and payable at fixed intervals of one year or less, but could not
be withdrawn without court approval. 43
Without reference to General Counsel Memorandum
36093 or Revenue Ruling 76-133, the Treasury applied the intervening case of Anastasio v. Commissioner2 1 in holding that
the economic benefit doctrine was applicable to interest.
The taxpayer has a vested right in the accounts and the interest that accrues for her in trust. Only passage of time prevents her having immediate possession of the interest.
Therefore, A is receiving a present economic benefit from the
interest.... We conclude that A must include in her gross
239. Priv. Ltr. Rul. .78-39-075 (June 29, 1978).
240. Id.
241. Id.

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 67 T.C. 814 (1977). See supra note 179.
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income for each taxable year during the term of each time
deposit account held for her benefit the amount of interest
credited to each account during that year.24 5

In Private Letter Ruling 79-261-63, the Treasury reached
an identical result under similar facts.246 Presumably, the
Treasury is now247 in a position to argue that not only does
the economic benefit doctrine apply to interest as well as prin-

cipal, but that such interest will be included in the minor's
gross income under the normal manner for reporting interest
on investment vehicles. As the only precedent for this conclusion is Treasury rulings, this matter will ultimately be resolved
by litigation. 48
D. Escrow Arrangements to Effectuate the Sale of Property
The utilization of escrow agreements to defer the reporting
of income by cash basis taxpayers has been described as "inherently fishy. '2 49 Nonetheless, the courts in applying the
economic benefit doctrine have attempted to distinguish between escrow arrangements established for pure tax deferral
purposes, which are subject to inclusion under the doctrine,
from those established for sound business purposes, which are
not.250 The tension between conflicting motivations has pre245. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78 39 075 (June 29, 1978).
246. Pri. Ltr. Rul. 79 26 163 (Apr. 2, 1979).
247. In Rev. Rul. 83-25, 1983-1 C.B. 116, the Treasury has perhaps taken a third
approach to this issue. Under the assumed facts of the ruling, a court order established
a trust for the benefit of a minor. The trust was funded with damages awarded the
minor as a result of a personal injury suit. The minor was to receive the award on
attainment of majority. Prior to that time, the trustee could invade the trust for the
support needs of the minor. After referencing the economic benefit doctrine and Rev.
Rul. 67-203, 1967-1 C.B. 105, the Treasury concluded that the minor was the owner of
the trust under I.R.C. § 677(a) and as a result the income would be includible in his
income.
248. On a slightly different issue but in a manner consistent with other applications
of the economic benefit doctrine, the Treasury, in Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74,
held that a taxpayer did not have to include in income any portion of a payment for
personal injury where the defendant's insurer had purchased an annuity to fund its
settlement obligation and the annuity was owned by and maintained as a general asset
of the insurance company. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 37687 (Sept. 25, 1978) (reaching
a similar conclusion).
249. J. DODGE, supra note 64, at 231.
250. As a result of the enactment of I.R.C. § 453 in 1982 pertaining to the reporting of installment sales, and the rather expansive regulatory interpretation of its provisions (See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3) which in certain instances treats
escrow deposits as payments), many situations previously only subject to inclusion
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vented the establishment of a bright line test that can be applied with certainty in every instance.
Murray v. Commissioner251 is an illustration of an instance
where a court found that a compelling business reason justified the utilization of an escrow arrangement to effectuate the
sale of property. In that case the petitioner sold his stock in a
publishing company.25 2 Under the terms of the sale the proceeds were placed with an institutional escrow agent and subjected to certain restrictions.253 Under the sales contract the
seller had agreed to a noncompetition clause for a five year
period.2 5 4 The escrow agent was instructed to invest the proceeds during this period and to pay the interest, as earned, to
the sellers.2
The principal was to be paid to the seller in
installments over the five year period, provided that the sellers
had not violated their noncompetition clause. 6
The taxpayer attempted to report the gain on the sale incrementally, as it was actually received, pursuant to the then
elective installment method. 257 The Commissioner countered
that the sale of stock was "completed" in the year of execution
of the sale documents and that the funds placed in escrow
258
were includible in the taxpayer's income in that year.
While the economic benefit doctrine had not been articulated
at this early date, the Commissioner attempted to assert the
same principles which caused the establishment of the doctrine. Specifically,259 the Commissioner argued that "there
was nothing for the petitioners to do under the contract ex-

under the economic benefit doctrine may be currently subject to inclusion under § 453

as well.
251. 28 B.T.A. 624 (1933).
252. Id. at 625.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 626.
256. Id. at 626-27.
257. Id. at 627.
258. Id. at 628.
259. Additionally, the Commissioner argued that the escrow agent was the agent of
the taxpayer and that the taxpayer was required to report the proceeds in income in the
year the agent received the funds. The court rejected this argument by stating that it
found "no justification in the agreement for holding that the trust company acted as
agent for either party to the exclusion of the other." Id. (citation omitted).
As discussed previously receipt by agent is frequently asserted by the Commissioner
in conjunction with the economic benefit doctrine and constructive receipt. See supra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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cept to await the passage of a period of time. ' 26 0 While recognizing the force of the Commissioner's arguments, the court
found that the noncompetition clause was a "vital" part of the
contract and that the purchaser might not have purchased the
stock in the absence of such a provision. 26 1 Finding the purpose of the escrow arrangement motivated by valid, compelling business reasons, the court concluded that the seller did
not realize gain until the proceeds were delivered by the escrow agent to the taxpayer.2 6 2
Where no legitimate business interest motivated the establishment of the escrow, the result was different. In Kuehner v.
2 6 3 the United States Court of
Commissioner,
Appeals for the
First Circuit, citing the Sproull case, concluded that the ultimate recipient of escrowed funds was required to include the
proceeds in gross income in the year the escrow was created.
This inclusion was required when the escrow agreement was
merely created to defer the reporting of the gain. In Kuehner,
the taxpayer was the owner of stock in a jewelry company.2 6 4
The Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company entered into an
agreement with the taxpayer to purchase the stock.2 6 5 Pursuant to the sales agreement, the taxpayer transferred all of his
stock to an independent financial institution which agreed to
serve as trustee to effectuate the sale.2 66 The purchaser likewise transferred the total sale proceeds to the trustee. Over a
five year period the trustee agreed to transfer annually a proportion of the stock to the purchaser and the corresponding

260. Murray, 28 B.T.A. at 629.
261. Id. See also Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Tyler, 72 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1934). Gen. Couns. Mem. 35211 (Jan. 26, 1973)
poses an interesting application of this principle. Under the assumed facts of the memorandum, insurance agents who sold insurance policies under a premium financing plan
were required to deposit a percentage of their commission in an escrow account coowned by the insurance company and the agent. The agent could forfeit his interest in
the account upon the occurrence of certain events. The memorandum concluded that

the agent did not have to include the escrowed commission until actually received, because the prospect of forfeiture negated the applicability of the economic benefit

doctrine.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Murray, 28 B.T.A. at 629.
214 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1954).
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
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portion of the sale proceeds to the taxpayer.267 All interest
accruing on the escrowed fund was to be paid over to the taxpayer on the termination of the escrow.268 If the taxpayer
died, the balance of the escrowed funds was to be paid over to
his personal
representative and the stock released to the
9
buyer.

26

The Commissioner concluded that a sale of the stock had
occurred in the year of the creation of the escrow arrangement
and that the escrow arrangement was ineffective to defer the
report of gain. Unlike the Murray case there were no business
motivated restrictions or limitations on the escrowed funds.
The funds were irrevocably placed in a separate account beyond the reach of the transferor's creditors and administered
by an independent third party. The taxpayer's interest in the
account was nonforfeitable and not subject to any restrictions
other than the mere passage of time. 270 Referring to Sproull,

the court described the escrow as the transfer of "a fixed sum
...irrevocably set aside for the petitioner's sole benefit."' 27' In
applying the economic benefit doctrine, the court determined
that the entire gain was includible in the taxpayer's income in
the year the escrow was established.
In Pozzi v. Commissioner,272 the Tax Court developed the
application of the economic benefit doctrine to escrow arrangements by focusing its inquiry on the role of the seller in
structuring the transaction.273 Where the buyer was willing
to consummate the sale immediately, the motivation of the
seller in attempting to defer the receipt of the sale proceeds
was deemed a proper inquiry. In Pozzi, the petitioners agreed
to sell a ready-mix concrete plant and business to a buyer for
267. Id.
268. Id.

269. Id.
270. Id. at 440.
271. Id.

272. 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
273. This was an interesting development. In the early cases developing the economic benefit doctrine, the courts emphasized the volitional conduct of the taxpayer in
structuring the deferral arrangement as important to the doctrine. See, e.g., McEwen v.

Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1018, 1025-26 (1946) ("Hence his failure to personally receive
that amount was due entirely to his own volition.") However, as the doctrine developed
the taxpayer's subjective intent became insignificant when the taxpayer had a vested

right in a fund that had been irrevocably placed by his obligor beyond the reach of his
creditors.
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$200,000.274 The buyer was willing to complete the transaction on a cash basis in 1963.275 The sellers were unwilling to
accept a total cash transaction and instead requested an installment sale. In response to these negotiations, the parties
agreed to an installment sale but also executed an escrow arrangement wherein the buyer deposited the total sale proceeds
in a collateral account.176 Under the terms of the escrow, the
buyer was required to transmit its installment payments plus
interest to the escrow agent.2 77 Upon receipt, the escrow
agent deposited the installment in the seller's account and simultaneously released to the buyer from the collateral account an amount equal to the installment payment. 278 The
Tax Court made a finding that the buyer was originally
"ready, willing, and able to make payment in full of the total
sales price, ' 279 and that the escrow arrangement was executed
at the request of the taxpayers.2 8 0 The court noted: "From
our consideration of the record we are satisfied that the escrow arrangements were attributable to the requests and demands made by petitioners and
were not attributable to any
28
demand made by the buyer." 1
The court then concluded that the total gain from the sale
of the business should have been reported in the year of the
execution of the escrow.282 The rules enunciated in Kuehner
and Pozzi remained settled interpretations of the economic
benefit doctrine as it applied to escrow arrangements
effectuat28 3
ing property sales until Reed v. Commissioner.
In Reed, the taxpayer originally agreed to sell his stock
holdings in Electromech Corporation in November 1973.284

Subsequently he became concerned about the federal income
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
reached
283.

Pozzi, 49 T.C. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128. See also Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971) (the court
a similar result under substantially similar reasoning).
82,734 T.C.M. (P-H 1982), rev'd, Reed v. Williams, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir.

1983).
284. Reed, 723 F.2d at 141. For a commentary on Reed see Note, Reed v. Commissioner: A Case for the Economic Benefit Doctrine, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1001 (1985).
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tax implications of the sale.28 5 As a result, he renegotiated the
sale to defer the inclusion of gain until 1974, so that the gain
could be offset against his contemplated capital losses in that
year. 86 The sales contract was modified to accomplish this
goal. 87 The closing on the modified contract occurred December 27, 1973.288 To effectuate the desired deferral, the sale
proceeds were paid to an escrow agent who distributed the
sale proceeds to Reed on January 3, 1974.289 During the six
days that the sale proceeds were held in escrow the funds apparently were not invested and no interest accrued.2 90 No
contingency other than the "passage of time" was imposed as
a condition for the final disbursement of the escrow on January 3, 1974.291 The taxpayer reported the gain from the transaction in 1974, the year of receipt.292 The Commissioner
asserted a deficiency arguing, inter alia, that the gain should
have been reported in 1973 under the economic benefit doctrine.293 The Tax Court in a memorandum opinion agreed
with the Commissioner:
Nevertheless, when, upon receipt of the goods, the buyer deposits the full purchase price in an escrow account to be paid
to the seller at a later date and no condition other than the
passage of time is placed on the seller's right to receive the
escrow funds, courts have held that the seller recognizes income when
the buyer deposits the funds with the
2 94
escrowee.

This reasoning and result were consistent with the law as
it had developed to that date. Nonetheless, the First Circuit
reversed the tax court on this issue. 95 In an opinion which
has been described as a "troubling narrowing" 296 of the economic benefit doctrine, the court enunciated three reasons for
the reversal.
285. Reed, 723 F.2d at 141.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.

290. Id.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Reed v. Commissioner,

82, 734 T.C.M. (P-H 1982).

295. Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138, 149 (lst Cir. 1983).
296. Burke & Friel, supra note 19.
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First, the court distinguished Reed from Kuehner on the
basis that in Reed the taxpayer did not receive some "present,
beneficial interest from the escrow account ....
The primary thrust of the court's argument is that in Kuehner the
taxpayer was entitled to interest accruing on the escrowed
funds which the court identified as "a complete and present
"297

economic interest in the funds.

' 29

The court attempted to

distinguish this situation from Reed where no provision was
made for interest and where the taxpayer "merely obtained an
299
unconditional promise that he would ultimately be paid.

The court's argument on this point is particularly unsettling
for a variety of reasons.
Prior to the Reed decision it had never been asserted that
the payment of interest on escrowed funds was a prerequisite
to the application of the economic benefit doctrine. In fact,
the lower court in its opinion in Reed was so unconcerned by
the taxpayer's interest argument, that its total discussion of
the issue was relegated to a footnote in which the court concluded "the fact that petitioner did not receive interest on the
escrowed funds is not fatal to the respondent's case." 3"
Moreover, there existed an established method for applying the economic benefit doctrine to non-interest bearing accounts. In Revenue Ruling 62-74,11 a contest sponsor placed
a cash award in a non-interest bearing account. 3°2 In applying
the economic benefit doctrine to this situation, the ruling required the winner to include the present value of the account
in gross income rather than the total funds in the account.3 °3
If the court in Reed was truly concerned about the absence of
interest, the appropriate solution would have been to require
the escrowed funds to be reduced to present value in accordance with the principle of Revenue Ruling 62-74.
Next, the First Circuit's interest argument in Reed seems
particularly unconvincing because the deferral period in297. Reed, 723 F.2d at 146.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Reed, 82,734 T.C.M. n.3. For a discussion of the significance of the presence
or absence of interest on escrow funds see Burke & Friel, supra note 219, at 251.
301. Rev. Rul. 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68.
302. Id. at 69.
303. Id. at 70.
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volved encompassed only a seven day period. Perhaps one
reason why no provisions were made for interest during this
seven day period was that due to the brevity of the period that
the funds were to be held, complicated by the seasonal bank
closings, the parties may never have contemplated that the
fund would be invested by the escrow agent.
Finally, in requiring what is described as a "present interest" to trigger the application of the economic benefit doctrine, the First Circuit had to reach an implicit conclusion.
The court had to conclude that the irrevocable transfer of the
sale proceeds by the buyer into an escrow account in which
the seller had a vested nonforfeitable interest created no interest on behalf of the seller that had any tax consequences. Disregarding totally the security afforded by the escrow
agreement, the court determined that all the seller possessed
was an unconditional promise that he would ultimately be
paid on January 3, 1974.
Second, the court in Reed did not include the escrowed
funds in Reed's gross income in 1973 because it concluded
that to do so would disturb the "well established principle that
a deferred payment arrangement is effective to defer income
recognition to a cash basis taxpayer, provided it is part of an
arms-length agreement. ' ' 30 4 While the court did not elaborate
on this point in detail, its mere statement suggests that the
court confused the economic benefit doctrine with the related,
but separate, doctrine of constructive receipt.
Under traditional notions of constructive receipt, a cash
basis taxpayer is able, as the court in Reed suggests, to contractually arrange to defer gain in arms-length transactions
even where there has been part performance of the contract. 0 5
While this is an acceptable principle of law in the normal instance, it was considered inappropriate where the obligor had
unconditionally transferred his consideration into a trust or
escrow in which the taxpayer had vested, nonforfeitable
rights. The suspect nature of the arrangement was heightened
where the obligor was willing to pay currently but was compelled to utilize the escrow arrangement at the behest of the
taxpayer desiring to defer gain. In such instances, where the
304. Reed, 723 F.2d at 146.
305. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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only condition delaying the payment to the taxpayer was the
passage of time, the courts established the economic benefit
doctrine as a tax inclusion principle separate and distinct from
constructive receipt.
Third, the court in Reed did not include the escrowed
funds in Reed's gross income in 1973 because to do so would
"significantly erode the distinction between cash and accrual
methods of accounting. 30 6 The gist of this argument is that a
cash basis taxpayer can only be compelled to recognize income when he receives cash or property of a "cash
equivalent. ' 3 7 Without elaborating, the court questioned
whether any economic benefit doctrine existed at all. By raising this issue, the court apparently asserted that the economic
benefit doctrine only applied in those instances where the taxpayer's interest on the fund would qualify as a "cash
equivalency."
Of all the court's assertions this is perhaps the most disturbing. One commentator has dismissed the court's assertion
as "simply incorrect as a matter of black-letter law. ' 30 8 As
discussed above, one of the motivating forces behind the
evolution of the economic benefit doctrine was the inability of
the cash equivalency doctrine to reach funded arrangements
when the taxpayer's rights were nonassignable. In establishing the elements of the economic benefit doctrine, the courts
repeatedly asserted that the absence of assignability alone did
not prevent inclusion in gross income under the doctrine.30 9
For example, in Pulsifer v. Commissioner,3 10 the Tax Court
clearly indicated that the economic benefit doctrine was separate and distinct from the cash equivalency doctrine. In response to the argument that the taxpayer's interest in the fund
had to be assignable to be includible, the court rejected the
argument because "the result is the same whether or not the
' 311
right to the funds is assignable.

306. Reed, 723 F.2d at 147.
307. Id.
308. J. DODGE, supra note 64, at 477.
309. See supra note 62.
310. 64 T.C. 245 (1975).
311. Id. at 247. See also Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814, 817
(1977)("[t]he mere absence of a right to assign has long been held not to constitute a
valid reason for reaching a different result.").
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Having confused the economic benefit doctrine with constructive receipt principles, the court in Reed then compounded its error by confusing the economic benefit doctrine
with cash equivalency principles. While the validity of the
court's analysis is suspect, the taxpayer's victory in the case
caused a temporary chilling effect on the future application of
the economic benefit doctrine by the courts and the Treasury.
This effect can perhaps best be understood by reference to
Vaughn v. Commissioner.12 This decision was first filed by
the Tax Court on November 30, 1983, five days prior to the
First Circuit's opinion in Reed. Although the facts of Vaughn
were elaborate and complicated, the relevant issues pertained
to the utilization of an escrow arrangement in an asset sale.
Specifically, the taxpayer transferred all of his stock in a corporation to his son, Steven.313 Steven then executed a nonrecourse promissory note, whereby he agreed to pay for the
stock in monthly installments over a twenty year period. 4
The contract provided that if Steven were to liquidate the corporation and sell the corporate assets, he would be required to
place the net proceeds in escrow. 315 Thereafter, all future payments to the taxpayer would be made directly from the escrow. 316 The corporation was subsequently liquidated, but
Steven failed to place the proceeds of the sale in the escrow
account.317
In its initial opinion in the case, the Tax Court concluded
that the escrow arrangement was an "integral part" of the
contract, and that the funds held in the escrow were not "subject to any substantial conditions or limitations other than
time of payment. ' 31 8 As a result of the familial relationship
between the parties, the fact that the liability of the son on the
promissory note to the taxpayer was nonrecourse and the fact
that the taxpayer could have contractually compelled the son
to fund the escrow, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer should include the gain in the year of sale rather than
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

81 T.C. 893 (1983).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899-901.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 913.
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the year of actual receipt.31 9 In reaching this conclusion the
court utilized both "substance over form" and constructive receipt principles.
Conceptually, the court could have concluded that as the
taxpayer could have contractually required the son to place
the proceeds in the escrow arrangement, the escrow agent was
in constructive receipt of the net proceeds. Further, since
such a transfer would have been irrevocable, the court could
have then ruled that the taxpayer was required to include the
gain in income in the year of the creation of the fund under
the economic benefit doctrine. This reasoning would have
constituted a limited expansion of existing caselaw in that it
would have utilized the doctrines of constructive receipt and
economic benefit in tandem. Nonetheless, it would have been
consistent with the orderly development of pre-Reed economic benefit doctrine theory.
Whatever the original analysis, the Tax Court subsequently reconsidered its opinion in Vaughn and reversed its
prior decision.32 ° Without extensive elaboration the court
simply reversed its position because the agreement to fund the
escrow with the liquidation proceeds "was never carried
out."32' 1 In short, the court retreated from what appeared to

be a dual application of constructive receipt and the economic
benefit doctrine, because the escrow had never been created,
even though the taxpayer could have required its funding.
The most curious aspect about the opinion on reconsideration is its veiled reference to the Reed case. After reversing its
previous position, the court noted that its reconsideration obviated the need to discuss Reed "since the instant case is not
an escrow case, it is not appropriate in this opinion to consider
the position of this Court with regard to Reed v. Commissioner ....

322

Significantly, the Tax Court has not had occa-

sion since Vaughn to address the issues raised by the First
Circuit in Reed.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 915.
87 T.C. 164 (1986).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168 (citation omitted).
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III.

THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT DOCTRINE

Predictions concerning the future of the judicially developed economic benefit doctrine defy generalizations. As this
doctrine has reached different stages of evolution in each of
the four separate categories in which it has been applied, overall predictions are singularly unconvincing. Despite this obstacle to summarization, a number of projections and
observations focused on each of the separate categories discussed above can credibly be asserted.
A.

Employer/Employee Relationships

Surprisingly, the judicially developed economic benefit
doctrine will have a minimal role in the employer/employee
relationship area in which it originally matured. This observation should not, however, be misconstrued to suggest that
the fundamental maxims of the doctrine will not apply to this
area of law. Congress, through the adoption of sections 83
and 402 of the Code, has preordained this result by enacting
the fundamental concepts of the doctrine as principles of statutory law.
Section 83 was enacted as part of the 1969 Tax Reform
Act.3 23 Under this section a taxpayer must include in gross
income the excess of the fair market value of any property
received in connection with the performance of services over
any consideration paid for such property.324 This section is
commonly referred to as a timing section because section 61,
standing alone, is sufficiently encompassing to require property received in connection with the performance of services
to be included in gross income.325 Section 83 merely clarifies
the taxable period in which the inclusion must be reported.
Under section 83(a), this inclusion must occur the earlier of
when the "rights of the person having the beneficial interest in
323. The legislative history of § 83 can be found in the following reports: H.R.
REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 86-89 (1969); H. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 61-65 (1969); S.REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 119-24 (1969);
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303-04 (1969).
324. See I.R.C. § 83(a)(1).
325. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). Although Smith was
decided under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, the result would undeniably be the
same under the current code.
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such rights not
such property are transferable or when are
326
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.

Although the terminology utilized in section 83 differs
from the terminology utilized by courts in applying the economic benefit doctrine, the fundamental concepts of the judicial doctrine are now embodied in the statute. Both the
statute and the doctrine operate to include in a taxpayer's
gross income the value of property irrevocably transferred by
a third party, typically an employer, into a fund in which the
taxpayer has vested nonforfeitable rights. Although the statute is not traditionally present in the cases applying the judicial doctrine, the Treasury regulations clearly indicate that
section 83 should be interpreted to reach such devices.327 Specifically, the regulation redefines "property" for purposes of
section 83 as follows:
For purposes of section 83 and the regulations thereunder,
the term "property" includes real and personal property
other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay money or property in the future. The term
also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money)
which are transferredor set asidefrom the claims of creditors
328
of the transferor,for example, in a trust or escrow account.

The expansive reach of section 83 is also clarified by reference to section 402(b). While the income tax consequences to
a beneficiary of a nonqualified employee trust arrangement are
not expressly mentioned or excluded from the operation of
section 83 to such trust arrangements, under section 402(b)
contributions to an employee's trust are required to be
"included in the gross income of the employee in accordance
with section 83 .

.

. except that the value of the employee's

interest in the trust shall be substituted for the fair market
value of the property for purposes of applying such
section."

329

As a result of the combined reach of sections 83 and
402(b), it has been asserted that section 83 "codifies" the com-

326. I.R.C. § 83(a).
327. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. I.R.C. § 402(b).
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mon law economic benefit doctrine.33 ° Such a conclusion is
appealing as it is difficult to envision a situation in the employment setting which would be subject to inclusion under the
judicially created economic benefit doctrine but not under section 83. This conclusion has to be seasoned with a few other
observations.
First, section 83 is only applicable where property is transferred "in connection with performance of services." ' 331 As a
result, the judicially developed economic benefit doctrine has
continued vitality in all the other non empl6yment-related areas in which it has been applied. To this extent the codification of the doctrine has only been partial.
Second, section 83 introduces a certain degree of flexibility
to the doctrine that was not present as the doctrine judicially
evolved. Specifically, section 83(b) authorizes a limited employee election. Under this election a taxpayer can affirmatively elect to include property in gross income at an earlier
date than either section 83 or the economic benefit doctrine
would have otherwise required. While taxpayers generally
seek deferral of gain, this election does insert a flexibility that
was not present in the judicial doctrine which could be beneficial to a taxpayer with a rapidly appreciating asset.
Third, while sections 83 and 402(b) could be read to fully
occupy the area in which the judicially evolved economic benefit doctrine operated in employment settings, the courts and
the Treasury have persisted in utilizing the reasoning and precedent developed under the economic benefit doctrine. For
example, in Private Letter Ruling 81 13 107,332 the Treasury
utilized the economic benefit doctrine to conclude that a fund
created for a rabbi by a synagogue was not currently included
in the rabbi income because the fund remained subject to the
claims of the synagogue's creditors.333 In reaching this conclusion, the Treasury utilized the elements of the judicially developed economic benefit doctrine. The same result would
have been reached had the Treasury applied the provisions of
330. See Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 263. See also Metzer, supra note 19, at
552 ("Section 83 both codifies and expands the common law notions of economic benefit
as they relate to property transferred in connection with the performance of services.").
331. I.R.C. § 83(a).
332. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81 13 107 (Dec. 31, 1980).
333. Id.
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section 83 to the transaction. Following Private Letter Ruling
81 13 107,11 4 the Treasury has issued a number of rulings
where the economic benefit doctrine is discussed in an employment setting to the exclusion of section 83.
In Minor v. United States,336 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the taxpayer's interest in a deferred compensation trust
was not includible in gross income. 337 The court determined
that the taxpayer's interest in the plan did not constitute income to the taxpayer. This conclusion was based on the
court's finding that as the plan was unsecured for the creditors
,of the employer, it did not constitute property within the
meaning of section 83.338 The court's ultimate conclusion suggests an application of the common law economic benefit doctrine and its elements.
As it is difficult to hypothecate a factual setting where the
economic benefit doctrine would require the inclusion of a
benefit in an employee's gross income while section 83 would
not, it is appealing to conclude that section 83 has codified
this doctrine in the employment setting. Despite this, it is interesting to note that the courts and the Treasury persist in
applying the judicial doctrine in instances where it historically
applied almost to the exclusion of the explicit provisions of
section 83.
B. Prizes and Awards
The provisions of sections 83 and 402(b) are only triggered
when property is transferred in connection with the performance of services. Therefore, in the traditional prize or award
situation, neither of these sections would operate to affect the
timing for inclusion of an award placed in a fund and paid out
to the winner on an installment basis.
The absence of legislative activity in this narrow area provides room for the continued application of the judicially developed economic benefit doctrine in its most pristine sense.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
See supra note 137.
772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1476.
Id.
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The Tax Court's decisions in Pulsifer v. Commissioner 339 and
Anastasio v. Commissioner 34 provide a bedrock of judicial
precedent which appears to settle this area. All of this suggests continued application of the doctrine in this area, without legislative supplement.
C. Personal Injury Awards
The continued applicability of the judicially developed
economic benefit doctrine in taxing interest earned on funds
established to pay damage awards on an installment basis is
clouded. This confusion arises from both the inconsistent behavior of the Treasury in applying the doctrine in such instances, and the legislative action in this area.
In Revenue Ruling 76-133, 3 1 the Treasury consciously 342
declined to apply the economic benefit doctrine to interest
earned on a fund which had been established for a taxpayer as
compensation for personal injury. Subsequent to this ruling
the Treasury, in Private Letter Rulings 78 390 75343 and
79 26 163, 34 altered this position and asserted that the economic benefit doctrine did require the taxpayer to currently
include in gross income interest earned on the fund established to compensate him. Research reveals no instance
where any court in a reported case has ruled on this precise
issue. As a result, any prediction as to how a court will determine the applicability of the doctrine in such instances would
be conjectural. Nonetheless, the rationale of Private Letter
Rulings 78 39 075 and 79 26 163 appears a reasonable and
logical extension and application of the economic benefit doctrine. It is therefore anticipated that a court, when presented
the opportunity, will support the Treasury's position on this
issue.

339. 64 T.C. 245 (1975).
340. 67 T.C. 814 (1977).
341. Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34.
342. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussion of Gen. Couns. Mem.
36093 (Nov. 29, 1976)).
343. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78 39 075 (June 29, 1978).
344. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79 26 163 (Apr. 2, 1979).
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An additional complication in this area is the 1983 amendment of section 104(a)(2).34 5 In this amendment, Congress extended the statutory exclusion from gross income of damage
awards to periodic payments.346 As currently constituted, section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether
as lump sums or as periodic
payments) on account of personal
34 7
injuries or sickness.
While this revision does not totally negate the application
of the economic benefit doctrine to interest earned on personal
injury awards, it certainly does provide taxpayers a method of
avoiding the consequences of the doctrine. If a taxpayer received a lump sum damage award and personally invested it,
the taxpayer would be required to include any interest earned
on the award in income.348 If this same taxpayer utilized the
lump sum to purchase an annuity, that portion of each annuity payment representing interest would be taxed to him in
receipt under the general principles of section 72. Thus, once
an award has been transferred to a taxpayer, general rules of
taxation determine when interest is to be reported. Likewise,
if an insurance company placed an award in a trust or escrow
account beyond the reach of its creditors, and the injured
party's rights in the account were vested, any interest earned
on the fund would logically be included in the gross income of
the injured party under the economic benefit doctrine. The
revised section 104(a)(2) simply would not apply in this
instance.
However, where the insurance company places no assets
or creates no fund beyond the reach of its creditors, but
merely agrees to pay the award over time, a different result
occurs under section 104(a)(2). Logically, each deferred payment will be comprised of an interest and principal element.
345. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976) (amended by the Periodic Payments Act, PuB. L.
No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (Jan. 14, 1982)).
346. The statute actually confirmed the extension of the exclusion. Previously the
Treasury in Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74 had reached a result similar to that established in the statute by application of the economic benefit doctrine to the installment
payment of a damage award. The Treasury concluded that no interest element be included in any installment payment of the damage award, because at all times the funds
utilized to pay the installments were subject to the claims of the payor's creditors.
347. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (emphasis added).
348. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
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This conclusion is particularly compelling where the insurance company actually purchases an annuity to fund its installment obligation. Nonetheless, the injured party is not
required to report the interest as income because of the provisions of section 104(a)(2).
While this arrangement would not be included in gross income under the economic benefit doctrine prior to the amendment of section 104(a)(2), the amendment of the statute
enunciated a clear rule and certainly prevented a possible future extension of the doctrine to such situations. The amendment of section 104(a)(2) has been criticized as bad policy,
and it has been recommended that this area be governed by
349
applying the economic benefit doctrine to such awards.
While this argument has intellectual merit, Congress has understandably expressed reluctance to tax damage awards to
injured parties. As a result, the favored treatment of such
awards in the Code is likely to continue.35 °
D. Escrow Arrangements to Effectuate the Sale of Property
Perhaps the most interesting predictions concerning the
future of the economic benefit doctrine arise in the context of
escrow arrangements to effectuate the sale of property. As
discussed in the text, the negative impact of the First Circuit's
opinion in Reed v. Commissioner351 was not a positive omen
for the continued application of the economic benefit doctrine
to escrow accounts. However, upon closer examination, the
effect of the Reed decision on the future of the doctrine may
not be as injurious as it first appeared.
As discussed in the text, the Reed opinion readily lends
itself to criticism. 2 Although most of this criticism has appeared in scholarly journals, it is likely that courts will per349. See, Frolik, supra note 226.
350. The Treasury in recent rulings has attempted to draw a distinction between

that portion of an award arising from personal injury that constitutes compensatory
damages and that portion of an award that would constitute punitive damages. See
Rev. Rul. 85-88 1985-2 C.B. 51. To the extent the courts support this new approach the

economic benefit doctrine would possess renewed vitality in this area. For a discussion
of this area see Bonnell, Back and Forth With the LR.S.; Taxation of Wrongful Death
Damages in Alabama, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 53 (1987).
351. 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
352. See, e.g., Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 260.
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ceive the same critical flaws in the Reed opinion that are
apparent to most commentators. Assuming this occurs, Reed
may be reduced to aberrational status by decisions in the
other circuits or possibly by the Supreme Court. For these
reasons, it is anticipated that the Treasury will, as the proper
cases present themselves, aggressively assert the issues which
it lost in the Reed case.
Perhaps a more interesting issue is the possible effect of
temporary regulation section 15a.453-1(b)(3) on escrow arrangements.3 53 This regulation was promulgated in 1981 pursuant to section 453 of the Code as amended by the
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980. 35 ' Although the Reed

opinion was issued in 1983, it related to the 1973 tax year. As
a result, the provisions of the 1980 Act were not applicable to
the case before the court.
Under section 453, a taxpayer is generally required3 55 to

report a transaction on an "installment method" 356 if there is
a disposition of property where "at least 1 payment is to be
received after the close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs.

' 35 7

Under the installment method, a taxpayer is

required to include "that proportion of the payments received
' which the overall gross profit
in that year"358
in the completed
transaction bears to the contract price.359 Thus, the profit
earned on the transaction will be reported proportionately
based on the amount of annual "payments" actually received.
As a result, the concept of payment is essential to the operation of the statute.
The term "payment" is defined in part in the temporary
regulations implementing section 453 as "receipt of an evi353. The potential effect of this regulation on the Reed situation was first suggested
in Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 251 n.3. But see Note, supra note 284, at 1017,
which suggests the regulation may exceed the Treasury's authority to issue regulations
under this section.
354. Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980).
355. Under I.R.C. § 453(d) a taxpayer may alter this effect by electing not to have
gain reported under the installment method. This election requires all gain to be reported in the year of disposition. As the intent of the taxpayer in Reed was to defer gain
an election under Section 453(d) would not have been seriously considered by the
taxpayer.
356. I.R.C. § 453(c).

357. Id. at § 453(b)(1).
358. Id. at § 453(c).
359. Id.
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dence of indebtedness which is secured directly or indirectly
by cash or a cash equivalent, such as a bank certificate of
deposit or a treasury note, will be treated as the receipt of
payment."36 Further light is shed on the intent of this definition in example eight of section 15a.453-1(b)(5) of the Temporary Treasury Regulations. This example hypothecates the
sale of stock for a million dollars in ten equal installments
with adequate stated interest. 361 To secure its obligation, the
purchaser placed $400,000 of cash and Treasury bills in an
escrow account.362 In the event of default on the note, the
seller looked directly to the escrow account for payment.363
Under the regulation, the $400,000 in the escrow account
would be treated as a "payment" in the year it was created.364
Had section 453 and the temporary regulation been in effect at the time of the Reed transaction, it would be logical
that the escrow fund would have been treated as a "payment"
in the year it was created and taxed accordingly. This result,
while motivated by a different source, would have resulted in
the same conclusion that would have occurred had the court
applied the economic benefit doctrine consistent with the
Treasury's position. Should a Reed situation arise in a post1980 fact situation, it appears likely that the Treasury will assert not only the economic benefit doctrine, but also the provisions of section 453 as a cumulative or alternative argument.
Both arguments appear convincing and persuasive.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The economic benefit doctrine is a fundamental principle
of our current income tax structure. Although exclusively judicial in origin, many aspects of the doctrine have been
adopted by statute such as section 83 of the Code. On occasion the doctrine has been incorporated in Treasury regulations such as section 15a.453-1 of the Temporary Regulations.
While its role has been altered over time by the courts, the
Code, and the regulations, the economic benefit doctrine re360. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3).
361. Id. at § 15a.453-1(b)(5).
362. Id.

363. Id.
364. Id.
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mains a vital flexible doctrine that will continue to ensure that
gain is reported consistently with the spirit and policy concerns of the Internal Revenue Code.

